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Abstract
PSYCHIC COLLAPSE AND TRAUMATIC DEFENSE:
HOW THE MIND MEDIATES TRAUMA LIVING IN THE BODY
by
Patricia Kim Yoon

Advisor: Denise Hien, Ph.D.
The aim of this exploratory study was to link psychoanalytic theories of trauma and its
impact on the mind with psychobiological research of how trauma lives in the body. The study
has expanded on prior research (Cramer, 2003) to evidence that defense mechanisms do in fact
moderate the relationship between stress and physiological response, and that there are likely
individual differences in physiological response to traumatic stress. This study goes further to
identify the psychological concomitants of these individual differences within an adult
population exposed to potentially traumatic events (PTEs), and their proclivity for using different
defense mechanisms. Defense use was measured simultaneously with autonomic reactivity
during a stress-response task for adults with no onset of PTEs (n=14), early onset of PTEs
(n=14), and late onset of PTEs (n=15). Findings suggest that there may be distinct, dissociativelike processes that differentiate the use of Projection and Identification for individuals who
endorse early onset of PTEs.
Results: Hierarchical regression analyses revealed that symptomatic adults who had been
exposed to PTEs prior to age 14 (early onset), and who tended to use Projection as their main
defense (over Denial and Identification), demonstrated significantly lower physiological arousal
than adults with late onset of PTEs. Those with early onset PTEs that used Identification as their
main defense, evidenced higher physiological arousal. These findings support the idea that
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working with trauma populations warrants careful attention to patients’ often variable, subjective
experiences of stress, their own active/passive coping strategies, as well as baseline physiological
reactivity, as potentially impacted by early exposure to PTEs. Altogether, this study further
evidenced the multi-determined nature of posttraumatic response. Early exposure to PTEs may
recalibrate defense use and bodily stress response systems, and thus must be viewed within a
developmental psychopathology framework.
Keywords: posttraumatic stress disorder, complex trauma, skin conductance, defense
mechanisms, TAT, dissociation
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
Introduction
It is well established that trauma has an overwhelming impact on the mind and body.
Early psychoanalytic theories of trauma have laid down a bedrock of understanding of how the
mind and psychic structure develops. Trauma has been a vital concept to understand through a
psychoanalytic lens, as much as it has been at the genesis of fundamental psychoanalytic theory
itself. Currently, psychoanalytic literature is inundated with compelling models explicating the
etiology, complex sequelae and experiences of trauma. The concept itself has recaptured our
popular attention with a kind of fury, due largely in part to the sociopolitical climate of our
times. However, it has only been in the last 30 years that the clinical description of PTSD has
emerged as a psychiatric category.
Despite the abundance of research on trauma, defining trauma has remained elusive.
What makes a trauma, traumatic? Moreover, recent epidemiological studies (Breslau, 2009;
Kessler et al., 2005; Brewin et al., 2000) show that PTSD is present in a significant minority of
the populations studied following exposure to trauma. According to Lee & Young (2001), up to
93% of the general population report exposure to traumatic events, but only 5-12% develop
PTSD. Certain types of trauma, pre-trauma vulnerability factors, as well as post-trauma
environments, have been found to be important in determining whether someone develops PTSD
after a traumatic event (Brewin et al., 2000). In the last decade, PTSD research has significantly
expanded due to an avalanche of research by modeling from bio-behavioral science, cognitive
psychology, and neuroscience. We can understand PTSD not only as an anxiety disorder from a
psychological perspective, but as a physical illness that impacts the body, compromising multiple
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systems including the immune, endocrine, and limbic systems. Qualitatively different from
stress, we know that trauma results in long-lasting biological change (van der Kolk & Saporta,
1991).
Yet, there is still inadequate knowledge about the etiology and vulnerability factors of
PTSD (Lee & Young, 2001). Moreover, the integration of research models has been limited. Few
have empirically investigated trauma from a multi-disciplinary perspective. The current study is
a response to this gap of integrated knowledge, about the mechanisms mediating the etiology of a
traumatic response. Specifically, the study’s primary interest is to expand the phenomenology of
psychic collapse that is so well documented in the psychoanalytic literature by connecting it with
the rich psycho-biological evidence of how trauma impacts the body. As an attempt to explore
the idea that trauma lives in the body and is mediated by the mind, this study will investigate this
link empirically. It proposes to do so by examining the psychological variable of defense use
with a physiological variable of autonomic reactivity, in a population of adults who have had
exposure to potentially traumatic events.
This systematic integration of psychoanalytic theory with psychobiological models can
help deepen our understanding of varied traumatic responses and appropriately consider how to
expand and modify treatment approaches. A core assumption of this study is that understanding
the unconscious meaning that an individual attaches to their trauma is an integral part of
recovery. This can help unlock individuals from the grips of traumatic organization.
Synopsis of Literature Review
The relevant literature will be reviewed in the following section. To begin, a brief history
of the concept of trauma will follow. A definition for the term trauma as it will be used in this
study will be delineated. Next, an overview of the current diagnostic categories of PTSD and the
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more discriminating features defining Complex Trauma or DESNOS (Disorders of Extreme
Distress, Not Otherwise Specified) will be discussed. These diagnostic categories will help
organize a discussion around some of the hallmark experiences of numbing, dissociation,
hyperarousal and hypervigilance that is so central to a traumatic response. They will also help
differentiate the experience of adults with an early, and more chronic history of trauma from
those with an adult onset of potentially traumatic experiences.
Next, the phenomenological experience of “psychic collapse” that is well elaborated in
psychoanalytic clinical writings will be reviewed. This section attempts to bring to life the
experiential aspects of traumatic response and suffering. Contemporary psychoanalytic theories
and paradigmatic models of trauma (Bonomi, 2003; Bromberg, 2003; Levy & Lemma, 2004;
Laub & Lee, 2003; Mills, 2008; Tarantelli, 2003; Verhaeghe & Vanheule, 2005) provide rich
clinical descriptions of some of the characteristic impairments of traumatized adults who tend to
defensively avoid symbolization and have lost the capacity to “think.” How might these
dynamic, unconscious processes also be investigated through current psychobiological and
information processing research models? The hypotheses of this study aim to address this
challenge.
The next section will define and review the concept of defense and defense mechanisms.
A brief and selective review of key ideas from an ego-psychological perspective will follow.
This perspective articulates a model of how psychic structure is formed and how the mind
develops. Ego psychology theory emphasizes the biological basis of psychoanalytic theory and
provides a useful framework with which to link current psychobiological findings as reviewed in
this study. This will tie in to a review of more contemporary theories of defense, specifically
covering a developmental model and manual (The Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM)) for
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measuring defenses as outlined by Phebe Cramer. The DMM will be used to measure defense
use for the participants in this study. This measure will help elucidate possible evidence of any
pre-existing structural deficits that result from, or may be a precursor to traumatic experiences.
The final section will survey the psychobiological impact of trauma and review recent
information processing theories. Psychoanalytic concepts will be tied to these current research
findings and conclude the present study’s rationale for how a study of defense mechanisms
contributes important information about the impact of trauma on mental operations, bodily
responses to threat and the development of psychic structure.

5

CHAPTER 2 : REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Defining Trauma - A Brief History
“After I was rescued and taken to the Grenoble hospital, I was told
repeatedly how ‘lucky’ I was to be alive, and for a short while I
even believed this myself. At the time I did not yet know how
trauma not only haunts the conscious and unconscious mind, but
also remains in the body, in each of the senses, ready to resurface
whenever something triggers a reliving on the traumatic event. I
didn’t know that the worst – the unimaginably painful aftermath of
violence – was yet to come” (Brison, 2002, p. x)
The aftermath of traumatic events to an individual’s life is complex and
multidimensional. The consequences can run far and deep, and are steeped in an essential
paradox: that the experience of selfhood is shattered, but that it must survive perforce, by virtue
that time and life carries on.
The introduction of posttraumatic stress disorder as a diagnosis in 1981 was a milestone
in recognizing the far-reaching implications of traumatic experiences into adulthood. It was first
introduced into the DSM-III as a response to the combat reactions experienced by Vietnam
veterans. It was derived from conceptualizations of early researchers of war trauma and included
the symptoms of re-experiencing, numbing/avoidance, and hyperarousal (DSM-III, 1980). The
diagnosis spoke to a real need at the time, when researchers were also beginning to investigate
other types of trauma from rape, domestic abuse/neglect, and childhood sexual abuse in
particular (Courtois, 2004). Though this newly available PTSD diagnosis emerged to a real need,
it began to cover a far wider range of traumatic experiences, well beyond those of combat
soldiers (Courtois, 2004). In response to this not-so-perfect fit, as well as to the numerous studies
indicating PTSD’s high rate of comorbidity with other disorders, researchers began to reconsider
what such co-occurrence meant about the diagnosis. Judith Herman termed “complex trauma”
after reviewing the clinical picture of survivors of prolonged, repeated trauma who presented
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with more differentiated symptoms (1992). These individuals exposed to trauma over
developmental time periods suffered from a multitude of psychological problems including
“depression, anxiety, self-hatred, dissociation, substance abuse, self-destructive and risk-taking
behaviors, revictimization, problems with interpersonal and intimate relationships (including
parenting), medical and somatic concerns, and despair” (Courtois, 2004, p. 413). In addition,
these experiences were categorized as comorbid conditions rather than essential elements of a
complicated reaction to trauma. Under a similar mission, Bessel van der Kolk led a field trial
study for PTSD, delineating a syndrome named DESNOS (Disorders of Extreme Stress Not
Otherwise Specified), based on findings that some individuals also consistently presented with
features not captured in the PTSD criteria. There has been strong empirical support for these
observations (Gold, 2004; Courtois, 2004; van der Kolk, 2005).
The diagnostic criteria for DESNOS covers three broad areas of disturbance. (Appendix
A includes a listing of current diagnostic criteria). These include: (1) a symptomatic picture that
is more complex, diffuse, and tenacious than in simple PTSD- including a combination of
somatic, affective and dissociative symptoms; (2) characteristic personality changes, including
deformations of relatedness and identity, disturbances in relationships, and alterations in selfperception; (3) the survivor’s vulnerability to repeated harm, both self-inflicted and at the hands
of others (Herman, 1992b).
These complex reactions were found difficult to treat and varied according to a number of
differentiating factors including the age and developmental period when trauma occurred, the
kind of trauma itself – including the severity and duration of experience, the support received at
the time of trauma and factors around disclosure of the trauma. Van der Kolk emphasizes the
importance of developmental factors in particular, reiterating that long-term adaptations to
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trauma vary greatly depending on the victim’s developmental stage, the relationship of victim to
perpetrator, and individual factors like temperament:
“Naïve one-to-one notions about the causal relationships between
trauma and these disorders would oversimplify the very complex
interrelationships among specific trauma, secondary adversities,
environmental chaos and neglect, nature of preexisting and
subsequent attachment patterns, temperament, special
competencies, and other contributions to the genesis of these
problems. However, if clinicians fail to pay attention to the
contribution of past trauma to the current problems in patients
with these diagnoses, they may fail to see that they seem to
organize much of their lives around repetitive patterns of reliving
and warding off traumatic memories, reminders, and affects”
(1996, p. 183).
Despite the continued advancement and delineation of varying traumatized responses, the
construct of PTSD continues to be a source of scientific controversy and debate. The complex
trauma concept and DESNOS category help to highlight important differentiating factors of the
effects of assaults on victims’ sense of safety, trust, self-worth and most importantly, their loss of
a coherent sense of self (van der Kolk et al, 2005). In addition to the hyperarousal and
hypervigilance in relation to external dangers that PTSD sufferers experience, complex trauma
poses an internal threat of being unable to “self-regulate, self-organize, or draw upon
relationships to regain self-integrity” (Courtois & Ford, 2009, p. 17). Understanding this
characteristic shattering of selfhood experience is essential to a study of traumatic response. It is
this defining feature of trauma which is under investigation in this study.
Psychoanalytic Theories of Trauma
“Traumatic experiences are initially imprinted sensations and
feeling states and are not collated and transcribed into personal
narratives…our interviews with traumatized people as well as our
brain imaging studies with them seem to confirm that traumatic
memories come back as emotional and sensory states with little
capacity for verbal representation…they may be encoded
differently from memories for ordinary events…perhaps because
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extreme emotional arousal interferes with hippocampal memory
functions…This failure to process information on a symbolic level,
which is essential for proper categorization and integration with
other experiences, is at the very core of the pathology of PTSD”
(van der Kolk, 1996, p. 296).
Contemporary psychoanalytic theories and clinical writings have attempted to address the
pervasive and overwhelming impact of trauma, leading to a severance of the mind, or inability to
think, in traumatized adults. The implications of this severance are not only relegated to a deficit
in mental operations but also refer to a severance between mind and body experiences as well –
the mechanisms of which will be explored in this study. The contributions from psychoanalytic
writings will be reviewed in order to ground a subsequent discussion of unconscious processes,
in the form of defense mechanisms and their relation to traumatic response.
Time and space, interrupted.
-“Time is the brain’s glue” (Modell, 2005, p. 556).
Clinical discussions of traumatic experience commonly include a phenomenon of
repetitive timelessness. That is, trauma is described as occurring “out there,” and not as an event
related to an experiencing subject, the “I” (Laub & Lee, 2003). The event is dissociated as an
external event from the survivor’s life so that their traumatic memories, which are self-contained
and ongoing, exists in a separate world, apart from the world of their present lives. Survivors are
unable to, and often do not want to reconcile these different worlds. Thus the memory is
timeless. Caruth writes: "traumatic experience...suggests a certain paradox: that the most direct
seeing of a violent event may occur as an absolute inability to know it (1996, pp. 91-92). She
continues to describe that what can be so persistently damaging about traumatic experiences is
"the fact that threat is recognized as such by the mind one moment too late. The shock of the
mind's relation to the threat of death is not the direct experience of the threat, but precisely the
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missing of this experience, the fact that, not being experienced in time, it has not yet been fully
known" (p. 62). It is an experience therefore, which cannot be experienced.
Carole Tarantelli (2003) reiterates the utterly external experience of trauma when she
likens the effects of catastrophic psychic trauma to an explosion of the mind: “in so far as an
explosion disintegrates whatever is in its epicenter, it cannot be perceived or experienced or
thought for there is nothing left to do so” (p. 916). Even though trauma is described temporally,
Tarantelli reminds us that it is not a process, but “an absolute sudden absence,” where the mind’s
defenses cannot divert the proliferation of non-stop anguish, where the mind is in an absolute
absence of defense, in an archaic, primitive state of mind (p. 920). The action of the explosion on
the mind as she describes it, is to disintegrate it: “psychic structure is disarticulated so that the
parts are no longer in relation to each other and functioning as a whole” (p. 920).
Losing the mind: The inability to think.
-“It is in the nature of trauma to evade our knowing of it” (Laub & Lee, 2003, p. 449).
Many psychoanalytic writings capture the experience of psychic collapse as a state of
mindlessness or as the mind losing its capacity for symbolization (Bonomi, 2003; Boulanger,
2005; Bromberg, 2003; Bucci, 2003). The individual enters a state where thought and action
collapse, so the psychic space where reflection could take place is shut down. Meanings become
too threatening to entertain so that thinking and perception are replaced by “concrete mental
entities that cannot be explored” (Caper, 1998, p. 145). These ideas are similar to the writings of
Bion, whose theories were predicated on the fundamental role that thinking played in structuring
psychic experience. Bion himself was influenced by his own traumatic experiences of war and
loss. He described how constricted his own thinking became as he prepared for battle:
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“In desperation I stopped thinking about past or future: I began
taking compass bearings of every object within my limited view. To
my relief my fear began to ebb away. This scene was to be
repeated over and over again in this new horrid shape throughout
the war until at last it began to lose its horror by force of repetition
(Bion, 1982, p. 201).
Bion’s theories brought a relational meaning to the term “thinking,” emphasizing that its
goal is the emotional awareness of self and others. Billow, eloquently summarizing Bion’s ideas,
writes that
“To satisfy the ‘need for awareness of an emotional experience,’
the developing individual must first depend on others to make
sense of experience. Early in development, reality cannot be
apprehended and constructed without others. Even for those whose
reality sense has matured, frequent social validation remains
necessary. […..}Thinking necessarily activates primitive, turbulent
emotions, and reinstates powerful early anxieties involving
separation and loss, and fear of new and unknown experience.
Absence of needed objects (including objects of knowledge such as
the complexities of one’s feelings, or another’s) stimulates thinking
to the extent to which one tolerates frustration {…} ” (Billow,
2003, p. 72).
Most importantly, Billow continues: “Thinking hurts. The human being suffers from
needing something painful. But fearful of pain, even the strongest sometimes evades what he or
she needs, and often chooses instead ways of avoiding thinking” (2003, p. 72).
Self-coherence: Affective disruption and going-on being.
Winnicott’s writings also capture the complex paradox of traumatic experience, linking
the experience of time with an emergent concept of self. As he writes about the experience of
self-continuity, he describes how the experience of being self-conscious can imply a kind of
split-off experience. That is, being so self-conscious compromises the sense of “going on being”
and becomes too far removed from the experience of being within the body and living in the
present (1949). His writings on how to view pathology in the context of where mind and body
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lose integration are especially useful to an understanding of relational trauma. In addition, he
describes a model of psychic structuring; how the failures of having our essential needs met
bring about an awareness of space and time within the first six months of life.
Winnicott describes how an infant’s incipient capacity to endure a moment when her
needs aren’t immediately met, exposes a sense of time. That is of course, if the need is met
within a “good enough” timeframe. If that experience of delay for the infant exceeds a tolerable
limit, then that is when a disrupted self-experience is created; when the mind becomes an entity
outside the infant’s once seamless existence of early psyche-soma. The mind then becomes overactive and attends reactively to the mother’s absence or inconsistency. Winnicott depicts a model
of health whereby an infant’s mind is developed in a way that helps the infant tolerate failures in
mothering, to use her mental capacity for delay and to experience time in order to sustain an
image of her “good enough” mother. In contrast, a more pathological mind creates discontinuity
in the experience of “going on being” as the infant spends excessive mental energy trying to
connect back with mom. This deprives the infant of a crucial experience of self-cohesion and
agency. Thus, the emergent “me” and “not me” experiences are formed through reconciliation of
the loss of the idea that the world is not actually just an extension of the mind-body experience of
early infancy.
Winnicott’s ideas are in sync with Bion’s writings on the significance and “painful
nature” of thinking (Billow, 2003, p. 73). Bion, as aforementioned, also contended that “thinking
inherently involves an exchange of painful, primitive feelings” (Billow, 2003, p. 73) The ideas of
Bion and Winnicott will reverberate in the ensuing discussion of the structuring of defenses, as
they inform Cramer’s developmental defense mechanism model. The relationship between
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psyche-soma is integral to understanding how psychic structure develops and thus how a break in
this continuity of development might lead to traumatic failures.
Defining Defenses – An Ego Psychology Perspective
“Defenses not only keep thoughts, images, and drive-impulses out of consciousness, but also
prevent their assimilation by the thought-organization” (Hartmann, 1965, p. 56).
When Freud revised his topographic model of the mind, he was driven primarily by his
clinical observations that there existed parts of the ego, namely the defenses, that were operating
unconsciously (Freud, 1926). His revised structural model included a more complex view of
how the ego managed both conscious perceptual capacities as well as unconscious
responsibilities for other defensive operations.
Anna Freud further emphasized the role of defenses and the difficulty in distinguishing
between defended and undefended communication (Mitchell, 1995). She was less interested in
repressed content than she was in understanding how it was that the ego kept things out of
conscious awareness. She also brought an important developmental perspective to the theory of
defenses which placed emphasis on early childhood experiences.
Heinz Hartmann further defined the ego as a substructure of personality, defined by its
functions. Specifically, he stressed the importance of understanding unconscious process from
the point of view of adaptation to the external world. “I want to stress…that defense-processes
may simultaneously serve both drive-control and adjustment to the external world…The ego
serves adaptation, inhibition and synthesis…” (1965, p. 385). The ego’s relation to reality was
seen as a central function (Hartmann, 1965). Also, the notion of autonomous ego functions
became explicated. He countered Freud’s idea that all mental functions were born out of
intrapsychic conflict. Instead, he viewed the ego to have important independent functions. For
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instance, the ego organizes and controls motility and perception – of the outer world and
perception of the self. The ego also acts as a protective barrier against external and internal
stimuli. The ego tests reality by action (not necessarily motorically) and by thinking, which can
be thought of as a kind of trial action. The ego can inhibit and delay discharge to allow for a
safer adjustment to the outside world as well as lessen the impact of internal stimuli. And
importantly, the ego is the signal of danger from which defense is initiated (Hartman, 1965).
In delineating these autonomous ego functions, Hartman made an important contribution
to understanding the mutual influences of ego and id development and how the structure is
differentiated. Hartman begins acknowledging Freud’s theory: “In ontogenesis, the id-ego
differentiation follows the leads of outer and inner perception, of motility, and of the systems of
preconscious memory traces, of experience and learning. The replacement of hallucination by
thinking, of direct motor discharge by action, is an essential element in Freud’s theory of ego
development” (1952, p. 166). He outlines several forces as constituting ego development
including the impact of reality, the instinctual drives, and inborn characteristics of the ego and
their maturation. Some defense mechanisms, he argues from this perspective, have a hereditary
core. An important part of this theory is understanding that there are intrinsic physiological
processes underlying activities of the ego and which influence the timing, intensity, and direction
of ego development (Hartman, 1952). He outlines the apparatuses of perception, memory and
motility as being inborn and part of the biology of an individual before they become expressive
of conflict and experience. Thus, these have been in existence and functioning before conflict
occurs in a “conflict-free” sphere of functioning (1952).
“It may be that very early processes in the autonomous area—
cathectic organizations, but also physiological mechanisms that
develop in interdependence with them, factors like postponement of
discharge and also what Freud calls the protective barrier against
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stimuli and even reflectory defenses against unpleasant stimuli—
are genetically speaking precursors of what at a later stage we call
defense mechanisms” (Hartman, 1952, p. 170).
Rappaport further detailed the specifics of the ego’s autonomy from the drives and from
the external environment, stressing that the ability to stay independent from the drives allowed
one to have a solid relationship to the outside world (1951). He helped answer questions of how
psychic structure is formed and how the ego maintains its independence from the environment as
he investigated how the ego’s autonomy, in the face of its inevitable relationship to conflict - is
destroyed. How does it adapt to reality? And what is conflicted with the drives?
“We must remember that the motor, perceptual, and memory
apparatuses, as well as other inborn apparatuses such as those of
affect expression, stimulus barrier, etc. have definite thresholds
which are their structural characteristic. These structural
characteristics will set limits to the discharge of drive tension, that
is, to the pleasure principle, even when the need-satisfying object
is present, and even before drive discharge is prevented by the
absence of the need-satisfying object. The very nature of structure
will always prevent total discharge of tension. The existence of
inborn structural elements in the undifferentiated phase may be
what precipitates developmentally the differentiation of it into the
ego and the id. The developing ego then integrates these structural
apparatuses and re-represents their discharge-limiting and
regulating function in forms usually described as defenses. These
are the foundations of the primary autonomy of the ego”
(Rappaport, 1967, p. 363).
Rappaport stresses that the ego’s independence from the environment is guaranteed by
the ego’s relationship to the drives. The drives guarantee that behavior that may not be permitted
by the environment, will continue. Rappaport investigated instances when the ego’s autonomy
from the id was broken down; he noted it in periods of intensified drives, such as adolescence,
during stimulus deprivation, and in hypnotic states when someone is reducing their attention to
the environment and the hypnotist tries to interfere with reality oriented thinking. The drive
controlling structures depend on the environment to function effectively against the drives. He
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then investigated what interfered with the ego’s autonomy from the environment and noted that
massive intrapsychic blocking of the instinctual drives as well as danger and fear is what enlist
the drives to prompt surrender of autonomy.
The importance of the drives in Rappaport’s theory is particularly relevant to the
rationale of the present study. When drives aren’t satisfied, it creates an experience of delay. And
it’s this delay in time that builds psychic structure. It’s the experience of frustration that leads to
thought and structure – and to the building of a complex set of memories that can make a
sustainable object. He writes:
“Delay of discharge may be due to structural as well as
environmental conditions: either structural limitations or absence
of the need-satisfying object may bring it about. One consequence
of delay is that experiences preceding, surrounding, and perhaps
even following gratification, accumulate in the form of memorytraces. The organization of these memory-traces is of primary
interest for the theory of thinking. Evidence seems to be available
to show that such memories are organized around those drives, in
the delay and/or discharge of which they emerge first as
hallucinatory images and later as ideas – that is, around the drives
of which they are representations” (1951, p. 693).
The disequilibrium of drive states – or displeasure, is seen as the motivator for the first
thought. Freud, as mentioned above by Hartman, pointed to hallucinatory wish fulfillment as the
first thought. If the object is unavailable, the infant will try to cathect some “memory-trace” or
representation of it that can be brought back. This representation can be partial or whole and
invariably will be conjured from some physiological experience, as stated earlier in Hartmann’s
writings. Using Freud’s terms, the image will be hallucinated, but it is some kind of evoking of
the memory. This is what Rappaport calls the first thought and thus, it is crucial that it is in the
delay of gratification that generates it. Memory will always be part of thought – as one evokes
the memory of the object. The model is such that one is never really perceiving anything fully

16

apart from memory. Memory exists in the body, even before ideation. The memory of a mother
for instance, might come with feelings of satisfaction – the warmth, pleasure, and smell of this
experience underwrites a kind of procedural memory.
To summarize, it is this delay of gratification in time that motivates and structures an
emergent thought. This thought, at its earliest phase for an infant, can be thought of as a memory
trace originating from the body. The significance of a caretaking other as an essential component
of this memory trace, reiterates the aforementioned theories of Bion and Winnicott, who stress
how early relationships powerfully impact developing psychic mechanisms. This theoretical
model stresses the significance of physiological drive delay, the importance of time, and the
essential role of an ‘other’ in shaping how the mind comes into being. It also lays down a
framework to understand how an experience that is too overwhelming – in time or intensity can
traumatize one’s capacity to think, to relate, to connect back to the body. These early theoretical
models provide a useful lens to think about the impact of trauma, and particularly early,
developmental trauma, on a cohesive self-experience.
Contemporary Research on Defense Mechanisms
The ego then, is responsible for a host of related abilities and executive processing
functions involving cognition and affect, including information processing, reality testing,
memory and perception (Beosky, 1995). George Vaillant describes the ego as “the integrated
brain,” which bridges the emotional limbic system with the executive functioning of the frontal
cortex, and which “conveys the mind’s capacity to integrate inner and outer reality, to blend past
and present, and to synthesize ideas with feelings” (1993, p. 7).
In terms of defense mechanisms, modern psychodynamic theorists and researchers have
continued in the tradition of Anna Freud, viewing defense mechanisms as essential elements of
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adaptive ego-functioning and self-concept formation (Cramer, 1991, 2006; Vaillant, 1992, 2000).
Vaillant (1993) described defense mechanisms as “regulatory self-deceptions” that function like
the ego’s version of the body’s immune system, protecting the mind from vulnerabilities to
potentially overwhelming negative emotional states, the way white blood cells act to stave off
infections. This view of defenses as normative and adapative also implies that the adaptiveness
of defense use is context relevant (Cramer, 1991, 2006; Vaillant, 1993). In situations in which a
person has no control over a difficult situation, use of a defense mechanism would serve to
alleviate the anxiety and distress that could distract from problem-solving. However, when faced
with a situation in which real-world solutions exist, utilizing defense mechanisms could be
detrimental to functioning. Overusing defenses may lead to distorting an individual’s perception
to the point of ignoring threat.
From an object relations point of view, the role of defenses is integral in terms of how
individuals moderate their emotions in order to maintain their relationships and ties to important
others. Tuber (2012) writes about the “holy trinity” of “self-affect-other” as a paradigm for
depicting personality formation and thus, understanding the formation of defenses (p. 37). This
paradigm stresses how “the very nature of our experience of our selves and others in interaction
is always bathed in an affective mileu” (2012, p. 37). Thus, as individuals begin to manage their
emotions as a way to organize and expand their experiences of self, they need also to manage
arising emotions to maintain their ties to others. How much they need to modulate their emotions
depends in part on how these others respond to them. As a helpless infant, the impact of others is
essential to survival and the more they would need to rely on others to contain them. Caretakers
provide a kind of stimulus barrier to protect against dangerous external factors as well as
overwhelming inner sensations. Tuber reiterates that the role of defenses early in life depends
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more on caretaking others. As individuals develop cognitively and mature affectively, they
become more able to contain and self-regulate their emotional experiences. These viewpoints are
not at all dissimilar to the ego psychology theories previously reviewed in terms of the
emergence of defenses arising from bodily, affective states.
Using Tuber’s paradigm of self-affect-other, the development of defenses is explained as
arising from a maturation along a broad continuum of experiences within this paradigm. The
range from primitive to mature defenses can generally be mapped onto a developmental line,
where primitive defenses like denial are generally developed earlier in life as opposed to a
defense like intellectualization. The cognitive maturation that is required between denial and
intellectualization is apparent. However, Tuber (2012) reminds us that a simplistic, hierarchical
view of defenses will fail to account for defenses that can continue to develop with a level a
complexity throughout development:
“If we acknowledge the simple statement that defenses are
cognitive strategies, it seems reasonable to posit that certain
defenses, if they emerge in early life, can have a range of
sophistication from primitive to more nuanced as we mature. Other
defenses, however, take a certain degree of cognitive maturity for
them to arise in the first place, but they too can become more
nuanced and differentiated over time. This model would allow for
a broader, and temporally longer, continuum for a defense
mechanism such as denial or avoidance, defenses that typically
arise in the first months of life but continue in an often more subtle
manner throughout the course of life” (p. 39).
This is an important point for the purpose of this study and its focus on three main
defenses of denial, projection, and identification. Though they may originate early in the course
of development, these defenses can be seen in more nuanced and sophisticated ways throughout
adult life.

19

Developmental Model Of Defense – The DMM
Longitudinal research on defense usage has lent support to the categorization of defenses
along developmentally based hierarchical lines (Cramer, 1991, 2003, 2006, 2008). Cramer’s
approach, in line with Tuber’s model, assumes not only a developmental nature of defense
mechanisms, but also describes the life course of defense use itself, as part of normative
cognitive development in childhood and adolescence. Cramer (2006) proposed that the Piagetian
(1952) stages of cognitive development implied the existence of developmental periods during
childhood and adolescence for which certain defense mechanisms would be more prominent than
others. As a child passed through these stages of increasing cognitive complexity, the use of
certain defenses would increase, while use of more simple, immature forms of defense would
typically decline. She points out however, that although the use of immature forms of defense
decline, they still remain part of an individual’s repertoire. At any given point in an individual’s
developmental history, they have access to currently predominating as well as previous forms of
defense.
Cramer developed the Defense Mechanism Manual – a scoring system (DMM; Cramer,
2000) to identify and classify defense mechanisms in narratives derived from the story-telling
projective test, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Murray, 1943). Cramer identified three
major defensive categories—Denial, Projection, and Identification, which encapsulated several
variations of defense according to core defensive themes. Each of the three defensive categories
required different degrees of ego complexity and represented a different developmental period.
Denial was the most immature of the three defenses and reflective of the cognitive capacities of
early childhood. Projection was moderately immature and reflective of the cognitive abilities of
older children and early adolescence. Identification was relatively mature and reflective of the
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improved cognitive capacities of late adolescence and early adulthood compared to earlier
developmental periods. Cramer drew on psychoanalytic theory to further conceptualize each
defensive category as having developmental roots in the sensorimotor reflexes of infancy.
According to Cramer, Denial described mental maneuvers that were based on wholesale
negation of reality, which could involve such phenomena as a person literally blocking out,
withdrawing from, or misperceiving outward events or internal experiences. As explained by
Cramer: “Denial is a simple defense, accomplished by the single operation of negating a thought,
feeling, or perception, as in, ‘It didn’t happen’ (2006, p. 23). The essence of Denial was
distorting or “not seeing” reality, which Cramer proposed was developmentally rooted to the
earliest of self-protective sensorimotor reflexes—the ability of the infant to close its eyes to shut
off stimulation from the outside world. Denial was thought to be the defense predominantly used
in young childhood.
Projection encompassed mental maneuvers which involve misattribution of hostile or
otherwise threatening feelings, attitudes and impulses to other people or the outside world. While
still an immature defense, Projection is considered more cognitively complex than Denial, since
it requires that the ego has the capacity to unconsciously differentiate the self from the outside
world, as well as uphold a moral judgment about what is acceptable and what is not. Cramer
proposed that the origination of this defense was the infant’s reflex to “spit out” noxious food or
unwanted objects placed in its mouth. Projection was thought to become the predominant form
of defense in early adolescence.
The category of Identification was tied to the ideas of self, identity and affiliation and thus
required increased cognitive complexity to achieve. According to Cramer: “Identification is the
process of taking on as one’s own (internalizing) the attitudes, beliefs, values, or behaviors of
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another, so as to protect oneself from feelings of weakness or helplessness” (2006, p. 23). An
example would be when a person tries to copy the tone of voice, words and gestures of an
authority figure to get through a difficult situation. Cramer conceptually linked Identification to
the infant reflex to take in food and other good things by mouth (i.e., incorporation). Cramer
points out that use of the defense of Identification involves evoking internalized representations
of other people, and not only reduces anxiety but bolsters the sense of self without distorting
reality. It is the defense most frequently used during late adolescence, during the period of
identity formation. Freud’s concept of hallucinatory wish fulfillment is paralleled here.
Cramer’s research with child and adolescent populations lent empirical support to the
developmental sequence of these defenses in human development (Cramer, 1997, 1998). She
found that use of denial normatively peaks in early childhood at approximately age 3, then
slowly declines in use, while use of projection slowly increases until peaking at age 10 before
declining, while identification emerges later in middle childhood and does not peak until
adolescence. Therefore, Cramer’s categorization of defenses follows a hierarchy from Immature
(Denial) to Moderately Mature (Projection) to Mature (Identification), as based on observable
developmental sequences.
Since its repeated validation of studies with children, the DMM has also been utilized with
samples of adults to assess defensive functioning. Studies utilizing the DMM in adult
populations indicate that these defensive categories can be found in all ages even if they are not
found to the same frequency as in child populations (Cramer, 2006). The utility of this scale is its
shared foundation in a developmental model of psychic structuring; one that inheres the psychesoma inter-relationship.
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Impact of Trauma
“What becomes disorganized is the whole series of action systems
that carry out the intentions of the ego: cognitive, coordinative,
executive (sensory motor) and autonomic” (Kardiner, 1969, p.
177)
In 1941, Kardiner coined the term “physioneurosis” to describe posttraumatic stress. He
explained that while people with PTSD reacted to their environment with emotional constriction,
their bodies continued to react to certain physical and emotional stimuli as if there was a constant
sense of threat (van der Kolk & Saporta, 1991). The individual’s tolerance for intense affects is
lowered and their stress sympathetic response system is triggered more frequently. Perry and
colleagues (1995) explain that “everyday stressors that previously may not have elicited any
response now elicit an exaggerated reactivity” (p. 278). In other words, there is a loss of
neuromodulation so central to PTSD leading to an increase in emotional reactively in general:
traumatized people go immediately from stimulus to response without being able to make
intermediate psychological assessments of the cause of their arousal, which causes them to
overact (van der Kolk & Saporta, 1991). This emotional responsiveness, is often an unconscious
response. It is this unconscious response, and perhaps the resulting or accompanying inability to
think, which is under investigation in this study. When the stress response has been triggered, the
less advanced systems in the brain, such as the brainstem and limbic areas (rather than frontal
cortex systems) can become dominant. As a result, abstract thought, concentration, and access to
language seems to become impaired (Perry et al., 1995). This is a concept previously reviewed in
terms of a breakdown of symbolic functioning. Here, it is discussed from a physiological
perspective.
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Psychobiological Impact
The autonomic nervous system, mediated by the amygdala is supposed to alert the
individual to the presence of a threat (Yehuda, 2002). The brain is able to communicate the
magnitude of the threat by releasing excitatory neurotransmitters and firing neurons that
correspond to the perceived level of threat (Siegel, 1999). However, when the autonomic nervous
system is constantly being set off by minor stimuli, the individual is no longer able to rely on her
bodily cues to be an accurate alarm system (van der Kolk, 2007). According to Siegel, “repeated
patterns of intense emotional experiences may engrain chronic alterations in the degree of
sensitivity” (1999, p. 248).
Evidence suggests that the longer PTSD symptoms persist, the less important the role of
the original trigger becomes when trying to understand the underlying symptomatology
(McFarlane & Yehuda, 2007). Once neurophysiological alterations in the brain become
established, the disorder seems to become entrenched. The “kindling model” suggests that
affective destabilization leaves a “biological memory” that leaves the individual more vulnerable
to future episodes of destabilization (McFarlane & Yehuda, 2007; Yehuda, 2002). The traumatic
event sets off a domino effect of biological consequences that are difficult to modify once they
have become ingrained. Van der Kolk & McFarlane explain, “This new organization of
experience is thought to be the result of iterative learning patterns, in which trauma-related
memories become kindled; that is, repetitive exposure etches them more and more powerfully
into the brain” (2007, p. 8).
In a meta-analysis conducted by Pole (2007) studying the psychophysiology of PTSD,
the general notion that PTSD is associated with persistent hyperarousal, exaggerated responses to
startling sounds, and elevated responses to external and internal trauma reminders was supported.

24

In the PTSD literature, the psychophysiological processes commonly measured included facial
(muscle) contractions, heart rate, skin conductance (sweat gland activity), and blood pressure.
Typically, these measures were expected to show increase under conditions of distress. However,
the meta-analysis usefully pointed out that each measure has its own biological underpinning as
well as unique interpretation that could be informative about the pathophysiology of PTSD. For
example, a dominant relationship in skin conductance as opposed to heart rate may imply a
special role of the sympathetic nervous system (where skin conductance is primarily governed)
as opposed to the implication of the parasympathetic nervous system, which is also implicated by
heart-rate. Thus, it is important to understand the directionality and dominance of these
psychobiological mechanisms of change.
Furthermore, research indicates the complexity of psychobiological responses to trauma.
It has been reviewed thus far that trauma results in a myriad of split or dissociated experiences of
mind and body. Traumatic memories are unintegrated sensorimotor experiences that are
recurrent, involuntary, and mostly nonverbal. They can be charged with hyperaroused, intense
affects involving fear and/or sadness. And they can also include intense bodily reactions.
However, they can also involve hypo-arousal - with little affect including somatic and affective
numbness. Nijenhuis & Boer’s (2009) review of the psychobiology of traumatization attests to
the complexity of these responses and argues that many psychobiological researchers simply
expect traumatized individuals to respond to reminders of trauma with fear. This may include
elevated heart-rates and increased blood pressure, or a general dominance of the sympathetic
nervous system during a fight-flight response. While there is certainly evidence of this, as has
already been reviewed, Nijenhuis & Boer’s (2009) review reminds us that this perspective could
easily ignore that the responses of survivors often have rather different responses to reminders of
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trauma – including a total submission to the perceived threat or a kind of detachment that still
allows for high functionality. It can also include a fluctuation between responses.
This dissociative response is well documented in the clinical literature, but not as easily
evidenced empirically. Research has demonstrated that the most far-reaching disturbance of
trauma revolves around the regulation of affective states. This affect dysregulation increases
vulnerability to engage in a variety of pathological attempts at self-regulation, including
dissociation.
Bromberg continues to describe the broadest purpose of a dissociative mental structure,
as not just serving a protective insularity, but for regulation. He writes,
“It is above all else a dynamic mental organization designed for
affective self-regulation – a mental structure tailored to anticipate
trauma but sufficiently permeable to be a potential doorway to
therapeutic growth. Its insularity reflects the necessity to remain
ready for danger at all times so it can never – as with the original
traumatic experiences – arrive unanticipated. Its permeability
reflects a capacity for authentic but highly regulated exchange
with the outside world and similarly regulated spontaneity of selfexperience (2003, p. 904).
Alan Schore’s (2002) contemporary research linking attachment and the neurophysiology
of the child’s brain offers further evidence of trauma’s impact on affect regulation. He writes,
“the infant posttraumatic stress disorder of hyperarousal and dissociation sets the template for
later childhood, adolescent, and adult posttraumatic disorders (PTSD), all of which show
disturbances of autonomic arousal” (p. 19). Schore’s (2002) compelling research suggests that
the disorganized/disoriented attachment pattern is most often seen in severely abused and
neglected infants. These disorganized infants with traumatic attachment experiences negatively
impact the early organization of the right brain, and thus produce deficits in its adaptive
functions. Namely, this is the ability to emotionally understand and react to bodily and
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environmental stimuli. The neurobiological evidence powerfully underscores the significance
and impact of events in a child’s early history. Schore (2001) describes “early relational trauma”
as “interactions that involve a strong activation of the attachment system that, although not
obviously comprising maltreatment, can induce a failure in the integrative functions of
consciousness at the beginning of life” (p. 478). This perspective underscores how the long-term
effects of trauma are numerous and complicated. The intrapsychic, relational, and social factors
are not the only issues that contribute to the long-term adjustment to trauma. There are biological
consequences of traumatization that impact individuals at different stages of development as
well. Hence, this provides the neurological basis for the vulnerability to dissociative reactions in
response to traumatic stressors later in life.
On Cognition
The phenomenological experience of psychic collapse has been earlier reviewed from a
clinical psychoanalytic perspective. These experiences should be considered alongside
contemporary theory and research on cognition and information processing models of
posttraumatic stress. Cognitive studies have indicated that individuals suffering from PTSD are
highly sensitive to traumatic information and cues (Buckley, 2000; Weber, 2008). These findings
are further supported by neuroimaging studies that identify brain activity during exposure to
traumatic stimuli. The brain shows activity in affective networks including the amygdala,
orbitofrontal and anterior cingulated cortex. The theory has generally proposed that PTSD
sufferers demonstrate sensitivity to threat-related stimuli as well as abnormal processing of
neutral information. Individuals with PTSD have demonstrated poor performance on a variety of
neuropsychology tasks that involve attention and memory (Buckley, 2000). Also, they
demonstrate a selective bias towards trauma cues which may inhibit their ability to attend to
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other information or provide interference in processing other kinds of information (Litz &
Keane, 1989). However, this evidence is not entirely consistent with research that also evidences
a capacity for enhanced cognition for neutral information. Behavioral results from other studies
hint that threat-sensitive individuals may react with a hyper-alertness that enhances attention
performance (Dennis et al, 2007).
Traumatic experiences may disrupt cognitive processes not only by overwhelming the
individual with memories and emotions, but also failing to integrate into general cognitive
schemas (Dennis et al, 2007). The psychoanalytic literature depicted a shattering of the mind
after trauma which rendered a traumatic memory that never integrated into the self-experience –
by virtue of its lack of spatio-temporal coherence. From a cognitive perspective, an individual
may need to be much more alert to cues, needing more time to evaluate and integrate current
experiences. According to Chemtob et al (1988), “. . . threat arousal inhibits the operation of
other information-processing modes or schemata, thereby preventing their operation and further
narrowing the attentional focus on threat-related stimuli” (p. 266). This places the emphasis on
traumatic cognitions that dominate the mind and lead also to temporal delays in the perception
process. Individuals with PTSD may be more susceptible and sensitive to ambiguity or novelty
as well.
The Present Study:
A Paradigm to Study Defense Use and Physiological Reactivity
Constructs of the unconscious mind and dynamic processes from psychoanalysis,
together with advances in psychobiology and cognitive science are ripe for constructing links
through empirical methods. This study attempts to integrate selective, core concepts from each of
these domains in order to lay down a model to empirically investigate the impact of trauma on
psychic functioning.
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Skin conductance activity has been one of the most widely used response systems in the
history of psychophysiology due in large part to its ease of measurement and sensitivity to
psychological states and processes (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007). It has been previously
reviewed that the psychological and physical impacts of a traumatic event frequently do not
cease after the end of the immediate event. Research also suggests that the trigger or cue that
provokes psychophysiological arousal may not necessarily be directly related to the original
trauma (e.g. Pitman, Orr, & Shalev, 1993). Reminders of the event may lead to an acute
autonomic nervous system arousal. Physiological reactivity to cued reminders has been
thoroughly documented in autonomic nervous system research (Pitman et al, 1993; Pole, 2007).
In a meta-analysis by Pole (2007), findings supported the idea that individuals have physical
reactions to internal (thoughts and feelings) and external (sounds, sights) cues. Participants with
PTSD had elevated heart rate and skin conductance, an indicator of sympathetic activity. The
findings suggest that PTSD is related to exaggerated sympathetic nervous system activity in
response to proximal or distal trauma cues.
In addition, it is important to note that individuals may be physiologically reactive to
trauma cues without self-reports of emotional distress. A study by Lazarus & McCleary (1951)
which has been replicated in studies of brain activity, demonstrated that reactivity to cues is
persistent and may occur outside conscious awareness. Furthermore, it has been researched
(Fowles, 1988) that skin conductance activity is influenced primarily by activation of a
neurophysiological behavioral inhibition system that is involved in responding to punishment,
passive avoidance, or to frustrative nonreward (Dawson et al, 2007). In other words, unlike
measuring a variable such as heart-rate, which is influenced primarily by activation of a
neurophysiological behavioral activation system, skin conductance can tell us something about
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inhibitory response, and the anxiety system. Thus, for the purpose of this study, measuring skin
conductance during an anxiety provoking task (such as responding to TAT cards), where there is
no active avoidance response to make, the skin conductance system should be the physiological
system that would be most responsive. In fact, we would be able to observe mental, unconscious
maneuvers of avoidance through the use of defenses.
For the purpose of this study, trauma is defined by its impact – by the experience of
psychic collapse that ensues and renders the mind unable to think and the body unable to live in
real time. Chapter 1 began with literature from clinical psychoanalytic perspectives that bring
this phenomenology to life. Next, relevant theoretical contributions from ego psychology were
reviewed that conceptualize how the mind is structured and formed. This body of theory supports
a model that links early physiological experiences - drives originating from bodily states – with
developmental mental achievements. An integral link between psyche and soma is supported
through this literature. This link continues to be supported in the next review of literature on
defenses and defense development. This review supports a relationship between defense use and
physiological processes, as well as a meaningful hierarchy of defense mechanisms that have a
predictable course of development.
In sum, this study capitalizes on the biological basis of psychoanalytic theory to
investigate the impact of trauma on the development of defenses and physiological arousal.
Linking these domains theoretically provides a means to hypothesize about the empirical links
detailed below.
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Study Hypotheses
Rationale for Hypothesis 1
Literature from ego psychology describes the ego as a substructure of personality which
is defined by its functions. A central function of the ego is its relation to reality. The ego acts as a
protective barrier against external and internal stimuli. Thus the activities of the ego such as
action (not necessarily motoric) and thinking (which can be considered a trial action) allow for a
safer adjustment to the outside world, and lessen the impact of internal stimuli. The ego can
detect danger and thus is the place where defense is initiated. Defenses, as unconscious
operations, play an important role in psychic structure formation. It follows from this theoretical
standpoint that trauma can have a significant impact on ego development, compromising the
structuring of the mind and influencing the defenses employed. This study predicts a relationship
between the onset of potentially traumatic experiences and level of defense use. Exposure to
early, chronic traumas throughout a lifetime have led to the conceptualization of complex
trauma, as a disorder that leads to the loss of a coherent sense of self. It is surmised that earlier
exposure to potentially traumatic events disrupt a continuity of self experience that can be
reflected in lower level defense use, based on the impact on psychic formation. Individuals who
have had exposure to potentially traumatic events early in their lives, as compared to individuals
who were exposed as adults, or never exposed, will demonstrate patterns of lower-level defense
use. These early onset individuals will also show a significantly greater use of these defenses.
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who endorse early onset (EO) of potentially traumatic events (PTEs)
will demonstrate an overall pattern of lower level defense use compared to individuals with No
Onset (NO) or late onset (LO) of PTEs.
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Rationale for Hypothesis 2
Research has indicated that the psychobiological response to trauma is complex. The
development of a chronic trauma-based disorder is qualitatively different than a heightened stress
response and carries a host of biobehavioral changes. Consistent with what we know about
complex trauma reactions and symptomatology, traumatized individuals can experience states of
hyperarousal and hyperreactivity as well as a traumatic re-experiencing that co-exists with
numbing, avoidance, and states of dissociation. Some individuals may develop re-experiencing
symptoms only, some may also develop avoidance and hyperarousal. The kindling process of
persistent intrusive and repetitive thoughts can set up a chronically disordered pattern of arousal.
To compensate for this chronic hyperarousal, individuals can demonstrate a biobehavioral
response of avoidance and emotional numbing on an everyday basis. Thus, individuals can suffer
both from a generalized hyperarousal that shuts down the sympathetic nervous system but also
creates a more sensitive negative feedback inhibition and greater physiological response to
specific threats or reminders. Arousal is regulated by the sympathetic branch of the autonomic
nervous system and can be captured in physiological markers like changes in sweat gland
activity.
Hypothesis 2: The early onset (EO) group will demonstrate greater physiological reactivity to a
stress-response task (administration of TAT) as indicated by overall changes in measures of skinconductance, as compared to the NO and LO group.
Rationale for Hypothesis 3
As stated, traumatic response is not limited to hyperarousal, but can include a
deactivation and slowing of physiological response. Physiological reactivity represents one
mediating mechanism in the hypervigilence towards threatening cues. Thus, the association
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between low physiological arousal and symptoms of numbing and denial needs to be further
explored. The pattern of defenses employed provide a way (as theoretical constructs) for us to
understand unconscious, psychological process. Defenses inform us of the limits and of the
strengths of anyone’s capacity to cope with stress. Defenses are also derived originally, from
physical experiences. They have a relationship to mechanisms experienced from and in the body.
Patterns of defense use will be measured simultaneously with physiological readings during the
same stress-response task for individuals with no onset of PTEs, EO, and LO of potentially
traumatic events in their lives. This provides an opportunity to investigate correlations between
patterns of defense use with patterns of autonomic response.
Hypothesis 3: During the same stress-response task (TAT administration), patterns of lowerlevel defense use will correlate with arousal levels, moderated by the chronicity (age of onset and
intensity) of PTEs in individual’s histories. Those individuals with early onset (EO) of PTEs will
demonstrate a stronger correlation, regardless the direction of the relationship. (i.e. the
correlation, direct or inverse, between defense level and arousal level will be stronger for this
group than for the NO or LO group).
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CHAPTER 3 : METHODS
Sample
The sample for the present study was derived from a pilot research project entitled
“Social and Nonsocial Threat Appraisal in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, (SOCIAL SCAN)” that
took place at The City College of New York. It was funded by The City Seeds Grant from City
College, an interdisciplinary initiative for scientific collaboration within the College. The project
was led by Principal Investigator, Denise Hien, Ph.D and Co-PI’s, Robert Melara, Ph.D., Lesia
Ruglass, Ph.D., and Eric Fertuck, Ph.D.
The sample for this study employed 43 participants. Participants were grouped by
exposure to potentially traumatic events (PTEs), as endorsed by self-report on the Life Events
Checklist: 14 who endorsed no onset of PTEs, 14 with early onset of PTEs, 15 with late onset of
PTEs. This study utilized male and female participants between the ages of 18-65 from diverse
racial/ethnic backgrounds who were recruited from IRB-approved newspaper and Internet
advertisements in the metropolitan New York City area. Fliers were posted in targeted locations
including community counseling centers, participating hospitals, rehabilitation centers and
college campuses.
Eligibility criteria included: 1) physically healthy; 2) normal or corrected normal visual
acuity; 3) aged 18-65; 4) fluent in English; 5) able to provide informed consent; 6) meets DSMIV criteria for Criterion A only of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (exposure to a traumatic
stressor) OR; meets criteria for sub-threshold PTSD (Cluster C or Cluster D); OR meets full
criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Individuals with no onset of PTEs met Criteria 1-5
only.
Exclusion Criteria included: 1) Past or present psychotic disorder or Bipolar Disorder;
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current major mood disorder or anxiety disorder allowed in up to 50% of the sample due to high
clinical comorbidity rates 2) Current alcohol/substance abuse or dependence (past abuse prior to
3 months before study permissible) 3) known history of seizures; 4) Participants with organic
mental syndrome 5) poor vision acuity; 6) Participants at significant risk for suicide based on
current mental state or history; 7) Participants refusing to be audio-taped. No onset PTE
participants were excluded if they met Criteria 1) no past or current psychiatric illness including
psychotic disorder, major mood disorder, anxiety disorder, personality disorder; along with
Exclusion Criteria 2-7 from above.
Procedures
Trained research assistants and assessors conducted initial screening interviews.
Responders to paper and online advertisements verbally consented to have an initial phone
interview with a trained research assistant to determine eligibility. They were asked questions
regarding demographics, basic medical and psychiatric history and substance use. Participants
deemed eligible after the initial phone interview arrived for a baseline assessment where they
were assessed using the following measures: Test of Nonverbal Intelligence (ToNI), The Life
Events Checklist, Clinician Administered PTSD Scale for DSM-IV (CAPS), Multiscale
Dissociation Inventory (MDI), Post Traumatic Symptom Scale Self-Report (PSS-SR), The
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), and Galvanized Skin Conductance Measure (GSR).
Measures
1. Test of Nonverbal Intelligence (ToNI) is a language and culture-free test administered in
15 minutes. It is a strong measure of general intelligence. Item content covers seven
different abstract reasoning and problem-solving skills: generalization/classification,
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discrimination, analogous reasoning, seriation, induction, deduction, and detail
recognition (Brown et al, 1997).
2. Life Events Checklist (LEC) is the self-report trauma assessment portion of the
Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale. It consists of 17 items, including lifetime exposure
to specific categories of traumatic events (natural disasters, sexual assault). Participants
are asked to indicate whether a given event happened to them, if they witnessed it
occurring to others, or learned about it occurring to someone else.
3. Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) is a structured, clinical interview for
assessing the cardinal and hypothesized frequency and intensity of signs and symptoms
of PTSD. The CAPS measures DSM-IV symptoms of PTSD, associated symptoms of
PTSD (e.g., survivor guilt), validity of responses, impairments in social and occupational
functioning, and overall symptom severity. The CAPS has also been found to have sound
psychometric properties.
4. Multiscale Dissociation Inventory (MDI) is a fully standardized and normed 30item self-report test of dissociative symptomatology. It measures six different
type of dissociative response (disengagement, depersonalization, derealization,
emotional constriction/numbing, memory disturbance, identity dissociation). The
MDI conceptualizes dissociation as a multidimensional variety of
phenomenologically distinct symptom clusters. Each symptom is rated according
to its frequency of occurrence over the prior month on a scale of 1 (never) to 5
(very often). The scale provides a reliable and valid way to quantify and delineate
specific types of dissociative symptoms.
5. Post Traumatic Symptom Self-Report (PSSR) is a 17-item self-report inventory, which
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assesses the frequency and severity of PTSD symptoms corresponding to the diagnostic
criteria listed in the DSM-III-R modified for the DSM-IV.
6. Thematic Apperception Test: (TAT; Murray, 1943; 20 minutes) is a widely used
projective measure used in the study of personality, including defense use and style. The
TAT consists of a series of cards with black and white scenes capturing a range of
ambiguous and evocative scenes. 8 TAT cards were identified in the TAT literature as
either most clinically useful or as generating the greatest amount of material (i.e., highest
number of themes) across individual performances. These included cards that had been
reviewed for scoring by Cramer’s Defense Mechanism Manual. The sequence of cards
presented to participants were: 1, 2, 3BM, 8BM, 8GF, 10, 13MF, AND 18GF. At the
presentation of each of the TAT cards, all participants were reminded to answer five
questions within their responses: what’s happening in this scene, what led up to it, what’s
going to happen, what are the characters thinking, and what are the characters feeling.
The TAT has been utilized as a stress-response task in previous studies (Cramer, 2003),
given the ambiguous and ominous content of the cards.
7. Galvanized Skin Conductance: This methodology measures electrical conductance in the
skin through detecting variance in sweat gland activity. Since sweat glands become more
active in association with the arousal of certain emotions (i.e. anxiety, anger), a higher
number and amplitude of conductance fluctuations is correlated to heightened levels of
stress. Utilizing this objective methodology to measure regulation of emotion greatly
strengthens the validity of self-report findings from the study, as it removes both
interviewer bias and placebo effect.
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Plan for data analysis
Aim 1: To assess defense mechanism use for all individuals in the Sample
The Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM: Cramer, 1991) was used to measure the
defense mechanisms of Denial, Projection, and Identification in participant’s responses to the
TAT. The author trained to criterion in scoring TAT stories with the DMM through practice
sessions using unrelated TAT response sets with 2 fellow clinical psychology doctoral
candidates, under the supervision of an experienced trainer. The sessions focused on the
operationalized scoring criterion of Cramer’s DMM. After training, all 3 coders independently
coded 10 new TAT response sets (provided by the supervisor). When adequate (r > .80)
reliability coefficients were achieved between these scores, it was assumed that the 3 raters were
scoring response sets in a manner consistent with the DMM.
12 randomly selected TAT response sets from this study were then transcribed by the
author and scored by the author and one other reliable rater. Both coders were blind to all
participants’ demographic data, trauma history, and physiological profile. To test inter-rater
reliability, a two way mixed model intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was computed using
absolute agreement as the standard. Then, the Spearman-Brown correction for double coding
(2*r/r+1) was applied (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). ICC values are all in the excellent range (0.94 for
Denial, 0.97 for Projection, and 0.97 for Identification) indicating excellent (.80 to .99) reliability
between raters. The remaining protocols were subsequently coded by the author.
Each of the 8 TAT stories provided by the 43 participants were rated and scored for each
of the defense mechanisms of Denial, Projection, and Identification. DMM scores were then
derived for each of these 3 defenses. A total defense score was calculated, representing the sum
of all defenses used. For example, the sum of scores for Denial Total, Projection Total, and
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Identification Total. In addition, the proportional use of each of the defense mechanisms was
determined. Denial Proportion, Projection Proportion, and Identification Proportion reflects the
proportional use of each defense mechanism relative to total defense use. For example, a Denial
Proportion score of .25 reflects the participant’s use of Denial relative to total defense usage, i.e.
25% of total defense use is Denial.
Aim 2: To collect and interpret physiological patterns of autonomic arousal through skin
conductance response (SCR) variables
This study utilized the ProComp2 multi-modality physiological recording equipment that
used sensors to recognize variances in salt and water from sweat glands during the TAT
administration. The detection of variances was possible because as the skin’s surface produces
more sweat, the electrical conductivity increases, reflecting a higher reading on the device
indicating higher levels of stress. (A normal range on a ProComp2 is between 0 to 30
microSiemens. One microSiemen is equivalent to 0.4 parts per million sodium chloride (salt) and
one meg ohm of electrical resistance.) The ProComp2 also provided both intrasession and
summary statistics at the end of each TAT administration session. Several variables of skin
conductance were determined for each participant.
Skin conductance level (SCL) is a measure of the average number of responses, or level
of arousal, a participant has throughout the entire TAT task. Individuals have a great degree of
variability in their baseline SCL so it is not as dependable a measure than other variables. SCL
can also be affected by environmental factors such as temperature and humidity in the room.
Skin conductance response (SCR) rate is a measure of frequency of SCR, or how many skin
conductance responses a participant has per minute. SCR amplitude is a measure of the strength
of the SCR. It is calculated by taking all of a participant’s SCR’s throughout the task and
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averaging their amplitude. The standard threshold for SCR amplitude in the literature, and used
for this study is 0.2. SCR rise and recovery time are highly correlated measures. SCR rise
measures how quickly the SCR takes to reach its maximum level. A higher SCR rise time would
take a longer time to reach maximum level, thus a lower SCR rise time should be related to
sudden arousal, versus a higher SCR rise time indicating a slow, gradual arousal. SCR recovery
measures the time it takes to return to the half-way point of arousal.
Aim 3: Compare DMM scores and SCR responses for NO of potentially traumatic events, EO of
PTEs, and individuals with LO PTEs.
Descriptive statistical analyses will be used to compare these scores across groups in order to
find correlations or significant relationships.
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CHAPTER 4 : RESULTS
Sample Characteristics
Demographics
The total 43 participants enrolled in this pilot study spanned a broad demographic
background. There were no significant differences between groups with No Onset (NO) of
Potentially Traumatic Events (PTEs), Early Onset (EO) of PTEs and Late Onset (LO) of PTEs
with respect to age, gender, IQ, education, and race or ethnicity as depicted in Table 1. The
average age of participants reporting No Onset of PTEs was 35 years (SD = 9). The average age
reported in the EO and LO groups was 32 years (SD =12) and 36 years (SD =10), respectively.
Participants in all groups had an average of 14-15 years of education, indicating some college
experience. The racial and ethnic composition of all groups was not significantly different. On
average, the composition was comprised of 32% Black, 21% White, 23% Hispanic, 12% Asian,
and 12% identifying as Other. All groups also had similar monthly incomes, the sample’s
average being $1489 (SD = $1181). The majority from each group identified as being single.
About three-quarters of the NO and LO group was fully or partially employed and about onequarter of the EO group were fully or partially employed.
Based on previous studies (Pelcovitz et al., 1997; van der Kolk et al., 2005), early onset
interpersonal PTEs are defined as sexual or physical violence experienced before the age 14.
Interpersonal PTEs are defined by inclusion of Life Events Checklist items endorsed for physical
abuse/assault and sexual assault. Non-interpersonal PTEs include endorsements of natural
disasters, transportation accidents, and exposure to toxic substances. Both the EO and LO groups
endorsed multiple PTEs. To investigate how EO and LO groups differed on the kinds of
potentially traumatic events they experienced, a chi-square statistic was conducted.

Table 1
Participant Demographics (N = 43)

Variable

Age
Education (years)
IQ
Monthly Income

Entire Sample
N = 43
M (SD)
Min

34
(10)
15
(2)
97
(10)
$1489 ($1181)

19
11
72
0

Max

No Onset
n=14
M (SD)

Early Onset
n=14
M (SD)

Late Onset
n=15
M (SD)

59
20
123
$5000

35 (9)
15 (2)
98 (9)
$1529 ($794)

32 (12)
14 (2)
92 (10)
$890 ($1426)

36 (10)
15 (2)
99 (9)
$1355 ($1488)

.672
1.00
2.60
1.09

2
2
2
2

.52
.37
.09
.35

n (%)

n (%)

n (%)

X2

df

p

3.59

2

.17

2.35

8

.97

6.90

6

.33

10.99

8

.20

n (%)
Gender
Female
Male
Race
Black (non-Hispanic)
White (non-Hispanic)
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Marital Status
Married
Separated
Divorced
Single
Employment
Full time
Part time
Student
Unemployed

23(53%)
20 (47%)

-

-

10 (23%)
4 (9%)

5 (12%)
9 (21%)

8 (19%)
7 (16%)

14 (32%)
9 (21%)
10 (23%)
5 (12%)
5 (12%)

-

-

5 (12%)
3 (7%)
4 (9%)
1 (2%)
1 (2%)

4 (9%)
2 (5%)
4 (9%)
2 (5%)
2 (5%)

5 (12%)
4 (9%)
2 (5%)
2 (5%)
2 (5%)

3
1
5
34

(7%)
(2%)
(12%)
(79%)

-

-

2 (5%)
0
0
11 (26%)

1 (2%)
0
3 (7%)
10 (24%)

0
1 (2%)
2 (5%)
12 (29%)

16 (37%)
17 (40%)
7 (16%)
3 (7%)

-

-

7 (16%)
5 (12%)
2 (5%)
0

2 (5%)
7 (16%)
3 (7%)
2 (5%)

7 (16%)
5 (12%)
2 (5%)
1 (2%)

Test statistic and
significance
F
df
p

Note. No Onset = no onset of potentially traumatic events. IQ Score from TONI-4 using Index Scores: 70-79 = Poor, 80-89 = Below
average, 90-110=Average, 111-120=Above average, 121-130=Superior, >130=Very superior.
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Table 2 shows the Pearson chi-square results and indicates that EO and LO groups were
not significantly different on whether they reported an interpersonal PTE (X2 = 0.45, p =.50) or
non-interpersonal PTE (X2 = 0.17, p = .68). In addition, using both self-report and clinicianadministered measures, there were no significant group differences in symptom type or severity,
as depicted in Table 2.

Table 2
Trauma type and symptom severity between trauma onset groups (n = 29)
Early Onset
(n = 14)
N (%)
Trauma Type
Interpersonal
Non-interpersonal

12 (85.7%)
12 (85.7%)
M(SD)

Symptom Severity
Re-experiencing
CAPS
PSS-SR
Avoidance/numbing
CAPS
PSS-SR
Hyperarousal
CAPS
PSS-SR
Total Severity
CAPS
PSS-SR

9.93
9.71

(10.03)
(8.12)

Late Onset
(n = 15)
N (%)

Test statistic and
significance
X2
p

14 (93.3%)
12 (80.0%)

.45
.17

.50
.68

M(SD)

t(df)

p

8.73
9.53

(9.45)
(9.80)

-0.31 (27)
-0.05 (27)

.74
.96

14.71 (14.93)
14.43 (12.36)

15.87 (13.86)
15.40 (16.12)

0.22 (27)
0.18 (27)

.83
.86

11.76 (10.80)
9.93
(9.97)

9.67 (9.04)
10.53 (8.98)

-0.58 (27)
0.17 (27)

.57
.87

36.43 (34.91)
34.07 (27.43)

34.27 (29.99)
35.47 (31.15)

-0.18 (27)
0.13 (27)

.86
.90

Note. PTE = Potentially Traumatic Event. Early Onset is PTE < 14 years old. Late Onset is PTE
> 14 years old. Interpersonal traumas include sexual and physical assault and abuse; noninterpersonal traumas include natural disasters, transportation accidents, exposure to toxic
substances. CAPS = Clinician administered PTSD Scale, PSS-SR = Posttraumatic Symptom
Scale Self Report.
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Defense Use
Defense variables were within acceptable limits for skewness and kurtosis, as indicated in
Table 3. Table 4 depicts defense use for the entire sample as well as by PTE onset groups. The
Total Defenses Used reflects the total sum of Denial, Projection, and Identification defenses used
by the participant in their stories for all 8 TAT cards. The entire sample (N = 43) used an average
of 31.88 (SD = 14.3) defenses during the TAT task. Of these, the most commonly used defense
was Projection (M = 14.26, SD = 9.09), then Identification (M = 8.88, SD = 6.42), followed by
Denial (M = 8.74, SD = 3.93). The Defense Ratio converts defense use into relative scores, with
the use of each individual defense expressed as a proportion of total defense use. In this
calculation, story length does not influence the defense scores. For the present study,
proportional calculations will be used for analysis. When comparing ratio scores, the most
commonly used defense was Projection (44%), followed by Denial (29%), then Identification
(27%).
Because each of the defense variables was normally distributed and the assumption of
linearity was not markedly violated, Pearson correlations were computed to examine the intercorrelations of the variables. Table 5 shows that one pair of defenses was significantly correlated.
There is a medium to high, positive correlation between the use of Projection and Identification
(r = .39, p < .01). This indicates that across the entire sample, the more individuals used
Projection, the more likely they were to use Identification, and vice versa.
To investigate how defenses were used on Low Arousal cards as compared to High
Arousal Cards for the whole sample (N = 43), a two-tailed matched pairs t-test was conducted
and revealed significant results. Table 6 shows that there was more average use of Denial on
High Arousal Cards compared to Low Arousal Cards, t(42) = -5.08, p < .001. There was also
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more average use of Projection on High Arousal Cards, as compared to Low Arousal Cards,
t(42) = -8.64, p < .001. In contrast, there was more use of Identification on Low Arousal Cards,
compared to High Arousal Cards, t(42) = 2.80, p = .008.

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics (N = 43)
Variable

Mean

SD

Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis

Proportion Denial

.29

.14

.10

.63

.84

.19

Proportion Projection

.44

.15

.08

.77

-.14

.52

Proportion Identification

.27

.15

.00

.57

.19

-.83

Proportion Denial in High Anx Cards

.29

.14

.00

.57

.25

-.79

Proportion Projection in High Anx Cards

.52

.18

.13

.82

-.42

-.30

Proportion Identification in High Anx Cards

.19

.15

.00

.62

.85

.58

Proportion Denial in Low Anx Cards

.31

.23

.00

1.00

1.43

2.31

Proportion Projection in Low Anx Cards

.29

.18

.00

.75

.21

-.42

Proportion Identification in Low Anx Cards

.40

.23

.00

.83

.01

-.80

SCR rate per minute (N = 38)*

6.73

3.88

.10

14.02

-.06

-.94

Re-experiencing symptoms

6.28

8.98

.00

35.00

1.56

1.89

10.33 13.63

.00

49.00

1.14

.18

9.48

.00

32.00

1.04

-.13

23.81 30.95

.00

116.00

1.15

.37

Avoidance/numbing symptoms
Hyperarousal symptoms
Total symptom severity

7.21

Note. *Physiological data for 5 participants were not successfully obtained due to technical difficulties.
Low Anxiety Cards: TAT 1, 2, 8GF, 10. High Anxiety Cards: TAT 3BM, 8BM, 13MF, 18GF.

Table 4
Defense use of entire sample and across trauma onset groups (N = 43)

Total Defenses Used
Total Denial
Total Projection
Total Identification
Low Anxiety Cards:
Denial Total
Projection Total
Identification Total
High Anxiety Cards:
Denial Total
Projection Total
Identification Total

Entire Sample
(N = 43)
M
SD

No Onset
(n = 14)
M
SD

Early Onset
(n = 14)
M
SD

Late Onset
(n = 15)
M
SD

31.88
8.74
14.26
8.88
12.32
3.37
3.89
5.07
19.56
5.37
10.37
3.81

29.14
8.00
12.29
8.86
11.29
2.79
3.21
5.29
17.86
5.21
9.07
3.57

34.47
7.87
17.00
9.60
13.14
3.14
4.71
5.29
21.00
5.00
12.29
3.71

31.86
10.43
13.29
8.14
12.53
4.13
3.73
4.67
19.80
5.87
9.80
4.13

14.30
3.93
9.09
6.42
6.53
2.13
3.70
3.67
8.40
2.56
6.30
3.38

8.27
3.68
5.44
5.11
3.67
1.97
2.29
2.98
5.01
2.46
3.93
2.56

18.79
3.26
12.40
6.77
8.62
2.11
5.08
4.27
11.16
1.92
8.45
2.84

14.02
4.52
7.61
7.52
6.67
2.20
3.35
3.89
8.24
3.18
5.72
4.53

Test statistic &
significance
F
p
.43
1.19
1.02
.00
.29
1.62
.58
.13
.49
.44
1.01
.10

Defense Ratio
Denial Ratio
29%
14%
27%
9%
26%
14%
35%
16%
1.11
Projection Ratio
44%
15%
43%
17%
47%
14%
41%
14%
.58
Identification Ratio
27%
15%
30%
16%
27%
15%
24%
15%
.39
Low Anxiety Cards:
Denial Ratio
31%
23%
24%
12%
25%
21%
45%
29%
1.62
Projection Ratio
29%
18%
29%
20%
33%
19%
24%
16%
.58
Identification Ratio
40%
23%
47%
24%
41%
23%
31%
19%
.13
High Anxiety Cards:
Denial Ratio
29%
14%
29%
13%
26%
13%
32%
17%
.44
Projection Ratio
52%
18%
52%
20%
55%
17%
48%
18%
1.01
Identification Ratio
19%
15%
20%
15%
18%
12%
20%
18%
.10
Note. Early Onset is PTE (potentially traumatic event) < 14 years old. Late Onset is PTE > 14 years old. Defense Ratio refers to use of
defense as a proportion of total defenses used. Low Anxiety Cards: TAT 1, 2, 8GF, 10. High Anxiety Cards: TAT 3BM, 8BM, 13MF,
18GF.

.66
.31
.37
.99
.75
.21
.56
.88
.62
.64
.38
.90
.34
.56
.68
.21
.56
.88
.65
.38
.90
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Table 5
Correlations between defense use across sample (N = 43)
1. Total Denial 2. Total Projection 3. Total Identification
1. Total Denial
1
2. Total Projection
.26
1
3. Total Identification
.03
.39**
1
Note**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)
Physiological Arousal
The physiological data for 5 participants were not successfully obtained due to technical
difficulties with the GSR apparatus resulting in poor conductivity. Of the total 38 participants
whose physiological data was captured, all SCR variables were found to be within acceptable
limits for skewness and kurtosis as shown in Table 4.
The physiological characteristics of the entire sample (N = 38) is depicted in Table 7. The
average Skin Conductance Response (SCR) rate for the entire sample (N = 38) was 6.73 (SD =
3.88). The EO and LO group had close SCR rate means: 6.52 (SD = 4.68) and 6.53 (SD = 3.50)
respectively.
The skin conductance variables collected are known to be correlated with one another
(Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007). Table 8 depicts that the physiological variables of this sample
were significantly inter-correlated. Overall, the higher the SCL, or number of SCR’s a participant
had, the higher was their frequency and strength of responses: r = .74, p = .01 and r = .87, p = .01
respectively. In addition, the faster or more sudden their arousal, the more quickly they
recovered: r = .90, p = .01.

Table 6
Comparison of defense use between Low Arousal Cards and High Arousal Cards (N=43)

Denial

Low Anxiety Cards
M
(SD)
3.37
2.13

High Anxiety Cards
M
(SD)
5.37
2.55

Low minus High
M
(SD)
-2.00
2.58

Test statistic and significance
t
df
p
-5.08
42
.000**

Projection

3.88

3.70

10.37

6.30

-6.49

4.93

-8.64

42

.000**

Identification

5.07

3.67

3.81

3.38

1.26

2.94

2.80

42

.008**

Note**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). Low Arousal Cards: TAT 1, 2, 8GF, 10. High Arousal
Cards: TAT 3BM, 8BM, 13MF, 18GF.
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Table 7
Physiological characteristics of entire sample and by Onset of PTEs (N = 38)
Entire Sample

No Onset

Early Onset

Late Onset

(N = 38)

(n = 12)

(n = 14)

(n = 12)

Test Statistic
&
significance

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

F

p

SC level

2.99

2.29

3.29

2.44

3.00

2.69

2.68

1.72

.20

.82

SCR rate

6.73

3.88

7.19

3.51

6.52

4.68

6.53

3.50

.12

.89

SCR amplitude

0.20

0.15

0.23

0.17

0.19

0.14

0.19

0.15

.23

.80

SCR rise time (s)

3.12

1.37

3.16

1.24

3.49

1.80

2.64

0.74

1.26

.30

SCR recovery (s)

7.75

7.11

6.90

5.77

9.98

9.75

5.98

3.74

1.15

.33

Note. PTEs = potentially traumatic events. SC = skin conductance, SCR = skin conductance response. 5
participants with poor SCR data were not included.
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Table 8
Correlations between skin conductance variables (N = 38)
1. SC Level

2. SCR rate

3. SCR
amplitude

4. SCR rise
time (s)

5. SCR
recovery
time (s)

1. SC level
1
2. SCR rate
.74**
1
3. SCR amp
.87**
.60**
1
4. SCR rise time (s)
-.59**
-.84**
-.55**
1
5. SCR recovery time (s)
-.50**
-.79**
-.49**
.90**
Note. SC = Skin Conductance. ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)

1

Relationships among Variables
Independent samples t-tests and correlational analyses (Table 9 and Table 10) were
conducted in order to determine whether there were any significant relationships between
demographic characteristics (including age, gender, IQ) and either defense mechanism or
physiological reactivity. There were no gender or IQ differences in the use of defenses or in
physiological responses. Only age was found to correlate significantly with use of Projection and
Identification as depicted in Table 10. As age increased, the total and proportional use of
Identification decreased: r =-.44, p = .003 and r =-.35, p = .02, respectively. In addition, as age
increased, the proportional use of Projection increased, r =.34, p = .03. Age did not have a
significant effect on any of the SC variables. Therefore, age was used as a covariate in
Hypothesis 3 regression models examining use of Projection and Identification.
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Table 9
Gender differences and defense use (n=20 males, n=23 females);
Gender differences and physiological reactivity (n=20 males, n=18 females)
M
SD
t
df
p
Variable
Total Defenses
-1.13
41
.27
Males
29.25
11.13
Females
34.17
16.49
Total Denial
-1.00
41
.32
Males
8.10
3.80
Females
9.30
4.04
Total Projection
-.40
41
.69
Males
13.65
8.19
Females
14.78
9.96
Total Identification
-1.33
41
.19
Males
7.50
4.15
Females
10.09
7.79
Denial Ratio
-.32
41
.75
Males
.29
.13
Females
.30
.14
Projection Ratio
.62
41
.54
Males
.45
.15
Females
.42
.15
Identification Ratio
-.32
41
.75
Males
.26
.14
Females
.28
.17
SC level
1.44
36
.16
Males
3.49
2.59
Females
2.43
1.84
SCR rate
1.17
36
.25
Males
7.43
4.25
Females
5.96
3.38
SCR amplitude
-.16
36
.87
Males
.20
.15
Females
.21
.16
SCR rise time (s)
-.94
36
.35
Males
2.92
1.41
Females
3.34
1.33
SCR recovery time (s)
-.17
36
.87
Males
7.56
7.21
Females
7.96
7.20
Note. SC = skin conductance, SCR = skin conductance response. 5 participants
with poor SCR data were not included.

51

Table 10
Correlation Analysis Between Age and IQ on Defense Use and Physiological
Reactivity
Age (N=43)
r
Defense Use
Total Defenses Used
Total Denial
Total Projection
Total Identification
Defense Ratio (% of total):
Denial Ratio
Projection Ratio
Identification Ratio
Physiological Reactivity
SC level
SCR rate
SCR amplitude
SCR rise time (s)
SCR recovery (s)

p

IQ (n=38)
r
p

-.260
-.097
-.054
-.443**

.092
.534
.731
.003

.015
-.121
.020
.079

.926
.441
.901
.617

.029
.336*
-.349*

.853
.028
.022

-.167
.055
.093

.286
.725
.551

-.128
-.110
-.106
.171
.240

.445
.512
.526
.306
.146

.042
.148
-.060
-.214

.800
.376
.721
.198

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis predicted that the Early Onset group would demonstrate an overall
pattern of lower level defense use compared to those with No Onset or with Late Onset of
potentially traumatic events. Three one-way within-subjects analyses of variance (ANOVA)
were conducted with the within-subjects factor being onset of PTEs (no onset, early, and late)
and the dependent variables being the use of 3 defenses. The means and standard deviations are
included in Table 4 where descriptives of defense use for the total sample have been previously
reviewed. The assumptions of the ANOVA were met and analyses revealed no significant
results. Whether one reported No Onset, endorsed Early Onset of PTEs, or Late Onset of PTEs,
there were no significant differences between these groups in their average proportional use of
Denial, Projection, or Identification respectively: F [2, 40] = 1.11, p = .34; F [2, 40] = .58, p
= .56; F [2, 40] = .68, p = .68. Hypothesis 1 was unsupported. In order to determine whether
there were group differences in proportional use of defenses on Low Arousal versus High
Arousal cards, another three, one-way within-subjects analyses of variance (ANOVA) were
conducted. These results are depicted in Table 11, demonstrating no significant differences
between groups for denial, projection and identification respectively: F [2, 40] = 2.12, p = .13; F
[2, 40] = 2.30, p = .11; F [2, 40] = .02, p = .98.
Figure 1 illustrates these non-significant group differences from Table 4, using the total
number of defenses used. Notable in this depiction, is the overall greater use of Projection
between arousal cards, across all groups. Also of note is the previously mentioned finding that
Identification use was greater on Low Arousal Cards than High Arousal Cards for all groups.
Implications of this trend are further discussed in a review of Hypothesis 3.

Table 11
Differences in Proportional Defense Use between groups for Low Anxiety vs. High Anxiety Cards (N = 43)
No Onset
(n = 14)
M (SD)

Early Onset
(n = 14)
M (SD)

Late Onset
(n = 15)
M (SD)

Test statistic and
significance
F
p

Denial Use on
Low vs. High Anxiety Cards

-.05 (.17)

-.00 (.21)

-.11 (.28)

2.12

.13

Identification Use on
Low vs. High Anxiety Cards

.28 (.18)

.23 (.18)

.13 (.21)

2.30

.11

Projection Use on
Low vs. High Anxiety Cards

-.22 (.21)

-.22 (.23)

-.24 (.23)

.02

.98

Note. Low Anxiety Cards: TAT 1, 2, 8GF, 10. High Anxiety Cards: TAT 3BM, 8BM, 13MF, 18GF.
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Figure 1
Group comparisons of defense use on High vs. Low Arousal Cards
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Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis predicted that the Early Onset group, over Late Onset or No Onset
group, would demonstrate greater physiological reactivity to a stress-response task, the TAT, as
indicated by overall changes in measures of skin conductance including SCR rate and amplitude.
The means and standard deviations of each group are included in Table 7, where physiological
characteristics for the total sample have been previously reviewed. Three one-way withinsubjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) were conducted with the within-subjects factor being
onset of PTEs (no onset, early, and late) and the dependent variables being SC characteristics.
The means and standard deviations and non-significant group differences are depicted in Table 7.
Whether one reported No Onset of PTEs, endorsed Early Onset of PTEs, or Late Onset of PTEs,
there was no difference between these groups in their SCR rates, F [2, 35] = .12, p = .89. Thus,
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. Low Arousal and High Arousal Cards were alternatingly
administered during the TAT administration, thereby contributing to the limits of capturing cardspecific physiological data in this study.

Hypothesis 3
The final hypothesis proposed an exploratory model to begin investigating the
correlations between patterns of defense use with patterns of autonomic response for the EO
group, predicting that for these individuals, their pattern of defense use and trauma onset would
predict physiological arousal, over and above PTSD symptoms. Given this study’s interest in
investigating a sample of vulnerable individuals who have been exposed to potentially traumatic
events at an early age, the proposed model included only those individuals who reported any
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PTSD symptoms, thus excluding those with CAPS scores of 0, even if they had exposure to a
PTE.
To investigate how well symptoms, use of defense, and onset of PTEs predicted
physiological arousal when controlling for age, a hierarchical multiple regression was computed
for each defense. The assumptions of linearity, normally distributed errors, and uncorrelated
errors were checked and met. In Table 12, when age and CAPS symptoms were entered in Step
1, they explained 23% of the variance in SCR rate, but not significantly, R2 = .23 , p > .05.

Table 12
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Symptom Severity, Onset of PTE, Use of Projection, Predicting Physiological
Arousal (n = 23)
Coefficients
Variable
Step 1
Age
CAPS symptom cluster severity
Re-experiencing
Avoidance/numbing
Hyperarousal
Step 2
Age
CAPS symptom severity
Re-experiencing
Avoidance/numbing
Hyperarousal
PTE onset (early vs. late)
Projection defenses (proportional)

B

SEB

β

-0.03

0.08

-0.07

0.43*
-0.26
0.06

0.20
0.17
0.16

1.01
-.87
.14

0.04

0.06

0.11

0.15
0.13
0.13
1.35
4.69

.93
-.87
.39
.07
-.69

0.40*
-0.26
0.17
0.57
-20.34***

R2

Δ R2

.23

.23

.64***

.42***

Step 3
.74***
Age
0.07
0.05
0.18
CAPS symptom severity
Re-experiencing
0.43**
0.13
1.00
Avoidance/numbing
-0.30*
0.11
-.99
Hyperarousal
0.20
0.11
.46
PTE onset (early vs. late)
8.53*
3.45
1.03
Projection defenses (relative to total)
-8.95
6.19
-.30
PTE onset X Projection defenses
-19.92*
8.10
-1.20
Note. Trauma onset was contrast coded with early onset = -1 and late onset = 1. PTE = Potentially traumatic events.

p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

.10*
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The beta weights suggest that the re-experiencing cluster of symptoms significantly contributed
to the equation (B = .43, p < .05). In Step 2, when onset of PTE and proportional use of
projection were entered, these entire group of variables significantly improved the prediction,
explaining an additional 42% of the variability in SCR rate, over and above what is predicted by
CAPS symptoms, R2 change = .42, F (2, 17) = 9.92, p <.001. The beta weights suggest that
when accounting for symptoms and onset of PTEs, the proportional use of Projection contributed
most to predicting SCR rate, with all variables significantly contributing to the model (B = 20.34, p < .001).
Adding the interaction at Step 3 further improved the model, with the significant
interaction suggesting that trauma onset moderated the relationship between projective defense
use and SCR rate. Specifically, these two variables were significantly negatively correlated in the
early onset group, but not significantly correlated in the Late Onset group, as illustrated in Figure
2. Follow-up simple slope tests were performed to examine the effect of the interaction. The
slope of the early onset group was significantly different from zero (slope = -31.29, t = -4.61, p
< .001) while the slope for the late trauma group was not (slope = -9.52, t = -1.26, p = .23).
Thus the interaction is such that the late onset group showed no difference in SCR over the
different levels of projection use, and the early onset group showed decreasing SCR with
increasing projection use. Thus, for these symptomatic individuals with Early Onset of PTEs,
using more Projection is associated with significantly lower physiological response than
individuals with late onset PTEs. There were main effects of re-experiencing symptoms, trauma
onset, and projective defenses in the final model. Each of these made unique, significant
contributions, predicting 74% of the variance in SCR rate.
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Figure 2
Interaction effect between use of Projection and PTE onset predicting SCR rate (n = 23)
14
12

SCR rate (minutes)

10
8
6
Early Trauma

4

Late Trauma

2
0
Low Projection

Average Projection

High Projection

-2
-4
Proportional Use of Projection

Note. SCR = Skin conductance response. Slope of early onset = -31.29, t = -4.61, p < .001 ;
slope of late onset = -9.52, t = -1.26, p = .23.

The next model examined the potential interaction between use of Identification and SCR
rate as shown in Table 13. Like the previous model, age and CAPS symptoms were first entered
at Step 1. When symptoms, trauma onset, use of Identification, and the interaction between the
variables were added, the model became significant. The entire group of variables with the
interaction, significantly predicted SCR rate, F (1,16) = 6.15, p < .05, adjusted R2 =.52. The
beta weights suggested that re-experiencing, avoidance/numbing symptoms, as well as onset of
PTEs all contributed significantly to predicting SCR rate. The interaction improves the
prediction by 19%. This significant interaction effect suggests that trauma onset moderated the
relationship between Identification use and SCR rate.

Table 13
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Symptom Severity, Onset of PTE, Use of Identification, Predicting Physiological
Arousal (n = 23)
Coefficients
Variable
Step 1
Age
CAPS symptom cluster severity
Re-experiencing
Avoidance/numbing
Hyperarousal
Step 2
Age
CAPS symptom severity
Re-experiencing
Avoidance/numbing
Hyperarousal
PTE onset (early vs. late)
Identification defenses (proportional)

B

SEB

β

-0.03

0.08

-.07

0.43*
-0.26
0.06

0.20
0.17
0.16

1.01
-0.87
0.14

0.01

0.09

0.02

0.46*
-0.28
0.07
-1.14
7.98

0.20
0.17
0.17
1.76
5.56

1.07
-0.92
0.15
-0.14
0.29

R2

Δ R2

.23

.23

.33

.10

Step 3
.52*
Age
-0.00
0.08
-0.01
CAPS symptom severity
Re-experiencing
0.55**
0.18
1.28
Avoidance/numbing
-0.33*
0.15
-1.09
Hyperarousal
0.09
0.15
0.20
PTE onset (early vs. late)
-7.77*
3.09
-0.93
Identification defenses (relative to total)
-5.08
7.18
-0.18
PTE onset X Identification defenses
24.66*
9.95
1.02
Note. Trauma onset was contrast coded with early onset = -1 and late onset = 1. PTE = Potentially traumatic events.

p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

.19*
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Figure 3
Interaction effect between use of Identification and PTE onset predicting SCR rate (n = 23)
14

SCR rate (minutes)

12
10
8
Early Trauma

6

Late Trauma

4
2
0
Low Identification
Average Identification High Identification
Proportional Use of Identification

Note. SCR = Skin conductance response. Slope of Early onset = 19.52, t = 2.71, p = .01;
slope of Late onset = -5.16, t = -0.65, p = .52

Figure 3 illustrates the significant interaction. Follow-up simple slope tests were performed to
examine the effect of the interaction. The slope of the early onset group was significantly
different from zero (slope = 19.52, t = 2.71, p = .01) while the slope for the late onset group was
not (slope = -5.16, t = -0.65, p = .52). Thus the interaction is such that the late onset group
showed no difference in SCR over the different levels of identification use, and the early onset
group showed increasing SCR with increasing identification use. That is, for symptomatic
individuals with early onset of PTEs, using more Identification is associated with significantly
higher physiological arousal than the late onset group. Table 14 followed steps from the previous
models and examined the potential interaction between use of Denial and SCR rate. No

62

significant relationships or interaction was found between the variables, yielding no significant
results for the model, F (7, 30) = .87, p =.54.
In sum, the final hypothesis was supported by the regression models predicting SCR rate
for the onset group in the use of Projection and Identification, but not in the use of Denial. That
is, when controlling for age, individuals with early onset of PTEs who use Projection as their
main defense (over Identification and Denial) showed lower physiological arousal, over and
above symptoms. Furthermore, the more projection they used, the lower their skin conductance
response rate would be. Individuals with early onset of PTEs who used Identification (over
Projection and Denial) showed higher physiological arousal. The more Identification they used,
the higher their SCR rates would be. Those who used Denial (over Projection and Identification)
demonstrated no significant predictive relationship to physiological arousal.

Table 14
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Symptom Severity, Onset of PTE, Use of Denial, Predicting Physiological Arousal
(n = 23)
Coefficients
Variable
Step 1
CAPS symptom cluster severity
Re-experiencing
Avoidance/numbing
Hyperarousal
Step 2
CAPS symptom severity
Re-experiencing
Avoidance/numbing
Hyperarousal
PTE onset (early vs. late)
Denial defenses (proportional)

B

0.43
-0.26
0.06

0.42
-0.31
0.15
-.75
7.34

SEB

0.20
0.17
0.16

0.20
0.17
0.18
1.82
5.65

Step 3
CAPS symptom severity
Re-experiencing
0.42
0.21
Avoidance/numbing
-0.31
0.18
Hyperarousal
0.15
0.18
PTE onset (early vs. late)
-.56
4.18
Denial defenses (relative to total)
7.56
7.18
PTE onset X Denial defenses
-.63
11.88
Note. PTE = Potentially traumatic events. p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

β

R2

Δ R2

.23

.23

.32

.10

.32

.00

1.01
-.87
.14

.93
-.87
.39
.07
-.69

1.00
-.99
.46
1.03
-.30
-1.20
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Post-Hoc Analysis
Hypothesis 3 produced 2 significant models predicting physiological increase and
decrease depending on the trauma onset and type of defense proportionally used. Figure 2
suggests that for a vulnerable and symptomatic group of individuals who experienced an early
onset of PTEs, their greater use of Projection yielded a reduction in physiological reactivity.
Figure 3 suggests that for the same vulnerable group, those who experienced early onset of
PTEs, and who used proportionally more Identification, had an increase in physiological arousal.
These findings counter the first two hypotheses of the study; namely that lower level
defense use might be aligned with greater physiological reactivity with this early onset group.
Following the developmental theory of defenses, it was hypothesized that the group using more
Projection would have greater physiological arousal than the group using mostly Identification.
The question emerged as to whether this discordance might be indicative of some dissociative
process. Thus, the data collected from the parent study’s self-report measure of The Multiscale
Dissociation Inventory (MDI) was incorporated into a post-hoc analysis for this study. Pearson
correlations were computed to examine the inter-correlations between subscales of the MDI and
all defense and SCR variables.
Table 15 shows that Derealization subscale scores were positively correlated with use of
Total Projection as well as Projection use in Low Arousal cards for the whole sample (r =.32, p
<.05; r = .37, p <.05, respectively). In addition, the subscale of Memory Disturbance was
negatively correlated with proportional use of identification (r =-.32, p < .05). Given that there
were significant correlations for projection and identification, further Pearson correlations were
computed to examine whether these correlations would differ between EO and LO groups.
Correlations indicated that proportional projection use on low arousal cards was
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significantly positively correlated with Derealization Sub-scores in the early onset group, r = .67,
p < .01, and positively correlated in the late onset group, but not significantly, r =.24, p = .40. A
Fisher's r-to-z transformation was conducted to determine whether the two correlations were
significantly different. Results show that they were not statistically different from each other, z
= -1.36, p = .17.
Proportional identification was found to be significantly negatively correlated with
Memory Disturbance Sub-scale scores (r = -.59, p < 0.5) in the early onset group. In the LO
group, proportional identification was negatively correlated with Memory Disturbance, but not
significantly (r = -.25, p = 0.37). Based on medium effect sizes, these non-significant results
may be suggestive of significant findings in a larger study. In short, there is some indication that
there may be more distinctive, dissociative processes that relate to the unique pairings of defense
use and physiological responsiveness.
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Table 15
Correlations between defense use, skin conductance and MDI scales
r
Disengage-

Deperso-

Derealization

Emotional

Memory

Identity

ment

nalization

Sub-score

Constriction

Disturbance

Dissociation

Sub-score

Sub-score

Sub-score

Sub-score

Sub-score

Skin conductance level

.202

.234

.205

.034

.079

.157

SCR rate per minute

.029

.011

-.053

-.060

-.051

.012

SCR amplitude

.175

.145

.159

.012

.112

.213

SCR rise time

-.056

.047

.086

-.021

-.094

.006

SCR half-recovery time

-.081

.028

.071

.042

-.098

-.085

.055

.083

.187

.008

-.051

-.027

-.077

-.029

-.011

-.102

.086

.072

.126

.168

.315*

.071

.055

-.049

Total identification

-.010

-.034

-.022

-.020

-.243

-.035

Proportion denial

-.047

-.058

-.090

-.077

.150

.132

Proportion proj.

.148

.184

.269

.168

.198

-.023

Proportion ident.

-.101

-.126

-.180

-.093

-.322*

-.094

Denial in low arousal cards

-.090

-.124

.002

-.074

.082

.067

Ident. in low arousal cards

-.018

-.010

-.032

-.002

-.254

-.078

Proj. in low arousal cards

.153

.205

.372*

.003

.047

.100

Denial in high arousal cards

-.045

.059

-.019

-.095

.064

.056

Ident. in high arousal cards

.002

-.054

-.007

-.036

-.187

.018

Proj. in high arousal cards

.093

.122

.235

.100

.052

-.130

Total defenses
Total denial
Total projection

Note. MDI = Multiscale Dissociation Inventory. SCR = Skin conductance response
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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CHAPTER 5 : DISCUSSION
“I thought how unpleasant it is to be locked out; and I thought how
it is worse, perhaps, to be locked in.” (Virginia Woolf, 1929, p. 24)
Summary of Main Findings
The exploratory nature of this study afforded an opportunity to examine some important
theoretical constructs in light of empirical evidence. Namely, the study examined the hypothesis
that early exposure to potentially traumatic events would have a qualitatively different impact on
individuals than late onset of such events. The questions for the present study were inspired by
clinical presentations of trauma survivors and psychoanalytic models that inform theories of
mind, and that in turn impact clinical conceptualization and intervention. The differences were
hypothesized to be evidenced by unique patterns of defense use and physiological reactivity. The
main findings indeed support this hypothesis, demonstrating that the onset of potentially
traumatic events is linked to distinct pairings between the use of a particular defense and its
moderating impact on physiological reactivity. The overall aim was not to identify conclusive
thumbprints branding early trauma survivors, but to better understand a potentially differential
developmental relationship that may exist between unconscious defensive functioning and
physiological reactivity.

High Projection Use and Low Arousal in Individuals with Early Onset of Potentially
Traumatic Events
The first main finding revealed that a group of symptomatic adults who had been exposed
to potentially traumatic events before the age of 14, and who tended to use projection as their
main defense (over denial and identification), demonstrated significantly lower rates of
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physiological reactivity than adults who were exposed to potentially traumatic events as an adult.
Moreover, using proportionally more projection significantly reduced their physiological
reactivity, compared to the late onset group. The implications of this finding suggest that this
early onset group who used projection as their modus operandi, used it effectively, such that it
lowered their arousal level during the stressful task.
To briefly review, the advantage of measuring skin conductance is that the autonomic
response system is not normally under conscious control. According to the theory, psychological
stress will activate the use of defense mechanisms. The greater the stress, the greater the need for
defense. Since stress also activates the autonomic nervous system, an increased use of defenses
should be related to heightened physiological arousal. The use of defenses protects the
participant from the conscious experience of anxiety, although arousal on the physiological level
may continue (Cramer, 2003).
That greater use of projection lowered the physiological stress response for these
individuals is consistent with the developmental theory of this defense. Projection emerges as a
defense of “expulsion” (Tuber, p. 40, 2012). This defense works effectively if it gets rid of
noxious, unwanted, or unacceptable feelings by attributing them to someone or something else.
The lowered physiological stress response with greater use of this defense can be interpreted as
an indicator of its effective discharging of the negative affect.
Of note, the Defense Mechanism Manual sub-category of projection that was
ubiquitously used by participants in this study was the “Attribution of Aggressive or Hostile
Feeling, Emotions, or Intentions to a Character, or Other Feelings, Emotions, or Intentions that
are Normatively Unusual” (Appendix B). This category was scored when such emotions were
attributed by the participant to a character in their TAT story, or when one character attributed
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them to another character, but only if such attribution was without sufficient reason. In addition,
references to a character’s face or eyes looking a certain way, or references to body position
were also scored under this sub-category. The literature has suggested that individuals with
PTSD demonstrate an expectation for threat and harm, as evidenced by selective attention to
threat cues and tendency to interpret neutral or ambiguous stimuli as threatening. This
hypersensitivity to threat is associated with heightened emotional responsiveness including
hypervigilance (Garfinkel & Liberzon, 2009). Other neurophysiological findings support that
PTSD is characterized by increased autonomic arousal in response to trauma-related stimuli, and
that these individuals are hypervigilant because their increased physiological arousal predisposes
them to readily process stimuli that are minimally threatening (Chemtob et al., 1998). What then,
might explain this significant main finding of lowered physiological response?
By examining the appraisal process itself, the literature suggests that the exact
mechanisms of attentional bias remains mixed (Buckley, Blanchard, Neill, 2000), including
findings that report that the development of PTSD is associated with specific appraisals
(McNally, 2003; Ehlers et al., 1998) and coping styles (Aldwin and Yancura, 2004). Whether the
pathways of appraisal are adaptive or maladaptive is multi-determined (Olff, et al, 2005). For
instance, epidemiological studies of PTSD prevalence has shown that compared to subjective
characteristics, the objective characteristics of events were far less sufficient predictors,
particularly with the chronic subtype of PTSD (Ozer et al., 2003). Subjective appraisals such as
perceptions of loss, threat, and harm may explain divergent results about the risk for PTSD.
Alternatively, divergent results in the literature have been interpreted in terms of habituation or
accommodation to chronic exposure to stress, such as coping with air raids, and exposure to
threat of terrorism (Arambasic, 1996; Zeidner and Bleich et al., 2003). There may be specific
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adaptive modes of coping with ongoing threat, as well as a kind of stress-inoculation process that
may be occurring.
Beyond the appraisal of an external event as threatening, it has been researched that
perceived controllability or belief in the effectiveness of coping can moderate biological stress
response (Olff et al, 2005). For individuals in this study, it would appear that though they may
perceive an elevated sense of threat, their ability to appraise effectually serves a protective
function. The seeming incongruence of greater defense use and lower physiological arousal
points towards the idea that goal-directed and self-preserving maneuvers employed by this group
may be seen as an adaptive response associated with efficacy of ridding negative feelings and
using skills primed for threat evaluation. By focusing on the how –whether the defense of choice
is effective, over the what- the defense of choice itself, there is opportunity to interpret the
findings from a strengths-based perspective. Reconceptualizing aspects of symptomatic
hypervigilance as an adaptive, effective skill, might help patients apply these strengths towards
other needed areas of weakness. Furthermore, given that these participants appeared to use more
projection when endorsing greater symptoms in the Re-experiencing cluster of symptoms, it
could be useful to reframe patients’ subjective symptoms (of intrusive recollections, distressing
dreams, acting/feeling as if event were recurring, psychological distress and reactivity) using a
perspective that underscores some aspect of their pro-active, adaptive responding.
In considering how effective this defense use may be, study findings suggest that there
are limitations to what can be interpreted. In the short-term, as far as moderating the
physiological arousal based on a stress-inducing TAT task, the findings support an adaptive
response. However while situational hypervigilance may be adaptive, it is difficult to determine
the long-term effects of this defensive strategy. This is a symptomatic group of participants
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whose marked reliance on projection corresponds to a significant increase in Re-experiencing
and Hyperarousal symptoms. It is possible that while in the short-term, the use of this defensive
strategy is effective, it has long run consequences, with evident stress-related symptoms. This
defensive coping may impede broader information processing abilities and maintain anxiety. In
addition, SCR rate, while found to be sensitive to threat cues (Phelps et al., 2001; Szpiler &
Epstein, 1976), is a measure that captures sympathetic nervous system activation. This is distinct
from endocrine and cardiovascular responses, which encompass both sympathetic and
parasympathetic activity. Biological studies of PTSD have established that the hypothalamicpituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis in PTSD sufferers have a unique profile of elevated corticotropin
releasing hormone (CRH). Moreover, in line with stress-response theory, PTSD is linked to the
phenomenon of allostatic load (McEwen, B.S., 2002), referring to the cumulative strain on the
body produced by repeated ups and downs of physiologic response, as well as elevated activity
of physiological systems under stress. That adaptive situational hypervigilance may be linked to
other potentially maladaptive, chronic (increased cortisol production, exaggerated startle
response) behaviors complicate the symptom picture.

High Identification Use and High Arousal in Individuals with Early Onset of Potentially
Traumatic Events
The second main finding with a group of vulnerable, symptomatic adults who had been
exposed to a potentially traumatic event before the age of 14, and who tended to use
identification as their main defense (over denial and projection), showed significantly higher
rates of physiological reactivity than adults who were exposed to a potentially traumatic event as
an adult. In addition, using proportionally more identification increased their physiological
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response. The late onset group who used more identification had significantly lower
physiological response compared to the early onset group. This finding suggests that the defense
of identification may have been used differentially between individuals with early exposure
versus late exposure to potentially traumatic events.
Following the developmental model of defense development, identification comes with
advances in object relations and the ability to differentiate between self and others. In short, one
of the main functions it may serve is to protect self-esteem (Cramer, 1991). In contrast to the
simple expulsion characteristic of projection, identification is a defense with more affective
sophistication. Use of identification allows for an internal transformation of affective experiences
into more tolerable, manageable internal phenomena (Tuber, 2010, p. 41). Identification may be
manifest in different ways. It may be seen in the wish or attempt to take on the skills or
accomplishments of admired others, or acquire their personal qualities. Identification is also seen
when the individual affiliates with another or group, for enhancing compromised self-esteem.
Within a traumatically vulnerable group, a prevalent use of this defense may reflect a
heightened awareness of one’s bad, malevolent, or threatened parts of self. The need to use this
defense reflects some cognizance of these different parts. In this way, the defense operates by
affiliating with someone unlike them, expressing an unconscious wish to preserve their own selfesteem. The present study findings that for the early onset PTE group, physiological arousal
increases with greater use of identification may be explained by the fact that unlike projection,
the use of identification does not negate or expel unwanted feelings. The damaged self-concept
persists and perhaps is reified in contrast to an “other,” despite attempts to affiliate with a “good”
self. Cramer delineates this use as “defensive identification,” or a way of avoiding anxiety and
maintaining self-esteem (2006, p. 108). This may be in contrast to the mechanism used by the
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late onset group, who demonstrates significantly lower arousal when using identification as their
modus operandi. Without a chronic history of developmental trauma, and thus a long-standing
“bad” self, it is possible that this group was able to use this defense more effectively and rely on
a “good” self that was not as compromised with later exposure to potentially traumatic events.
Cramer refers to this mechanism as “developmental identification” (2006, p. 110), a necessary
part of normal psychological development that contributes to the formation of a conscience, of
the ego-ideal, and of “identity.” Cramer explains that in contrast to defensive identification,
developmental identification leads to structural change in the self-representation (2006, p. 110).
Recalling early ego-psychology theories (Freud, 1926, Hartman, 1965, Blum, 1987), the
development of identification involves taking experiences with the outside world and placing
them inside to create new ego structures. With early trauma survivors, it is theoretically surmised
that such structural formation has been compromised and thus it is really the use of defensive
identification that is called upon during situations of stress and anxiety.
In early psychoanalytic studies on the consequences of trauma, the defense of
identification has been reviewed around the concept of identification with the aggressor. First
formulated by Anna Freud in her classic book The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence (1936),
this concept is related to the mastery of stress and shock trauma and to the tendency of the ego to
be active where it was formerly passive or helpless (Blum, 1987). It is understood as a response
to feeling overwhelmed with threat, and the adoption of behaviors, perceptions, emotions, and
thoughts of the aggressor. The tendency to identify with the aggressor is rooted in the child’s use
of identification to overcome feelings of fright and helplessness. The developmental roots of
identification with the aggressor are described by Spitz (1965) as identification with the “no” and
the beginnings of internalization of parental prohibitions which the child will begin to verbalize
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on her own, later in development (Blum, 1987). Once again, when considering an early
environment where this normal structuralization of prohibitions and ego-development are
disrupted, and when a sense of the world as safe no longer exists, this defense may be essential to
make one’s self disappear. It would be safer to transform ourselves into someone else’s image of
us, into the very thing that threatens us, in order to protect ourselves.
Contemporary psychoanalytic writings have investigated the links between identification
with the aggressor and dissociation as part of traumatic response (Frankel, J. 2002; Davis, J.M. &
Frawley, M. G. 1994). Davies and Frawley (1994) write:
“In addition to preservation of relational bonds, the survivor’s
identification with the perpetrator protects her from contacting the
helplessness and vulnerability of her victimized self. Survivors
report a paradoxical sense of power and control when they cut
themselves or drive recklessly, or engage in sex with men they
hardly know. Identifying with her perpetrator, the survivor
experiences this illusory empowerment, denying that her self-abuse
is hurtful. …Like their victimizers, they successfully split off a
sense of themselves as vulnerable, scared, and out of control” (p.
132).
Frankel (2002) writes about how habitual identification with the aggressor can lead to
masochism, chronic hypervigilance, and other personality disorders as a response to trauma. He
describes the:
“precocious development of hypersensitivities, super-intelligence,
even clairvoyance, whose purpose is to assess the environment and
calculate the best way to survive. Knowing the aggressor ‘from the
inside,’ in such a closely observed way allows the child to gauge at
each moment precisely how to appease, seduce, flatter, placate, or
otherwise disarm the aggressor. Without conscious thought, the
child suddenly discovers the precocious abilities that are needed
for the job (p. 104).
In these conceptualizations of the ways that the defense of identification may be used, the
prominent need to protect against imminent threat is apparent. Perhaps in contrast to the way that
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projection was used effectively, there may be more dissociative mechanisms involved in using
identification with the aggressor, assisting an adaptive response by selectively splitting off only
those feelings that may pose a threat in the immediate situation if they were expressed. The
presence of such dissociative features may be one explanation for the evidence of higher
physiological arousal with greater use of this defense in the early onset group. Davies (1998)
discusses the distinction between dissociation and repression where repression has the
unconscious “goal of keeping certain experiences entirely and permanently out of awareness,
whereas dissociation stresses the failure to integrate certain fundamentally incompatible
interpersonal experiences and the vertical splitting of consciousness into independent centers of
associational interconnection” (pp. 58-59).
The literature on the relationship between dissociative reactions and PTSD has been
extensive, yet mixed. One meta-analysis of pre and peritraumatic risk factors for PTSD
concluded that peritraumatic dissociation was the strongest predictor of PTSD (Ozer et al.,
2003). In others, the trauma itself seems to breed chronic dissociative symptoms. A history of
childhood trauma in particular, has been researched to be prevalent among adults who dissociate
(Dancu, Riggs, Heart-Ikeda, Shoyer, & Foa, 1996). As of yet, the available evidence indicates
that research is still needed to delineate the specific roles of all potential factors that may account
for the association between dissociation and trauma pathology – including pre, peri, and posttraumatic links. Much like the term “trauma,” dissociation has come to mean too many things
and the construct suffers from over-use.
Dissociation subscales and Defense Use
An unarticulated aim of this study has been to contribute to a better conceptual
understanding of some aspect of dissociation - is it a process, organization, psychological
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defense, or symptom? It is clear that dissociative phenomena is intimately tied to trauma
experiences. Might it be possible then to consider that the present study’s finding of high
projection use and low arousal, and high identification use and high arousal, are manifestations
of some aspects of dissociation? Post-hoc analyses were employed to investigate this question,
revealing significant correlations with some aspects of dissociation. Individuals with early onset
of potentially traumatic events who relied on projection on low arousal cards, endorsed higher
Derealization scores. Individuals with early onset who used proportionally more identification
overall endorsed lower Memory Disturbance scores.
Might this support the idea that particular psychological defenses may support the
adaptive or maladaptive use of varying forms of dissociation? Holmes et al. (2005) has evaluated
the differentiation of two qualitatively separate types of dissociation: detachment and
compartmentalization. They specified Derealization as an example of detachment, and Memory
Disturbance as a form of compartmentalization. Detachment is considered to reflect experiences
of disconnection from self and others while compartmentalization portrays disturbances in the
capacity to manage and experience certain internal processes of emotion, thought, and memory.
The former is an externalizing phenomenon, the latter a more internalized conflict. These
conceptualizations help to more closely target therapeutic interventions.

Case Studies
Drawing from the rich data of the TAT, 4 individual case studies will be discussed to
expand upon the main group findings. A qualitative analysis can further highlight the
complexities of individual difference, amidst the group effects. The following 4 participants were
chosen because their profiles approximate the study’s main findings. All 4 participants endorsed

77

early exposure to potentially traumatic events. 2 relied on using the defense of projection and
indicated a low arousal profile. Another 2 participants tended to rely on identification and
demonstrated high physiological arousal. A closer examination of their narratives helps bring to
life the nature of their anxieties, their main defenses against identified conflicts and fears, and
ways in which they attempt to reconcile them. This data enriches the study’s main findings by
adding clinical relevance. These qualitative analyses can be juxtaposed with a visual
representation of their physiological profiles as represented in Figure 4.

High Projection Users
Case of “Paula”: Early exposure to potentially traumatic events
Paula is a 23 year old Black female who endorsed childhood sexual trauma at age 9. She met
criteria for PTSD.
Card 1, the first to be administered, depicts a young boy contemplating a violin that rests on a
table in front of him. Paula’s responses are longer than most in the sample, running
approximately 24 minutes. Of note, her language throughout the task includes repetitions of
words, phrases, and ideas:
(Card 1) Well this little boy he looks as if he’s confused or he’s just sad about not
being able to play the violin as I can see. Or he’s been let down by a parent or has
been told he’s been disappointed in. And he feels as if he can’t accomplish certain
things so therefore he just put his instrument down and just looks at it as an
obstacle he can’t overcome. He, he wants more in life even though he’s just a
child he feels as if he shouldn’t be treated the way he is being treated or he
shouldn’t be told certain things the way he’s told. Because I know that kids they
usually feel as if when you’re told the harshest of truths it really affects them so.
He just looks, he’s really, really let down and he doesn’t know how to feel at that
point, at that given time. What may be happening next would be him giving up
completely playing the instrument probably be more serious in his work or in his
studies. But truly his passion lies within the instrument, you can see that. He
expects more in life but I feel like if he were to get older, he probably would try to
repress his passion for certain things and just go full fledge into the work field and
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try to forget about it. But even that you could see within his work he wouldn’t be
happy. He looks like he’s bored with work ‘cause there’s a book under the violin
and he looks like he doesn’t want to do anything pertaining to work. He rather just
play the instrument himself. That’s it.
Striking in Paula’s narrative is a lack of an organizing temporal glue. Though Paula generates
many words and offers a succession of hypothetical themes, it’s difficult to understand where the
story is going. Paula’s attempt to deal with the ambiguity of the card produces an abundance of
defensive reactions. Most prominently, she projects negative attributions onto the adult figures
and the child in the card is left confused, let down, and helpless. There is an emergent feeling of
disorganized attachment in the way the child relates to his predicament. The anxiety produced by
this first card causes Paula to grasp rather ineffectively at all her defenses.
With the 4th card, Paula’s use of projection is more fully prominent. While there
continues to be an ineffective temporal integration of the story, Paula begins to project
threatening, aggressive, hostile impulses with abandon and her narrative does convey a sense of
discharging all the rising, negative affect:
(Card 8BM) Woah. Okay! Well this kid looks like he’s from the Omen. I don’t
know who’s having surgery but it seems as if this child is losing something great
in his life so he has to watch on and hope and pray that this person lives on to help
him live. And he’s never seen some trauma like this in his life so now it’s like the
crossroads where he has to wait. These doctors on this person, it seems as if it just
happened over night like somebody broke into the house and somebody, a lot of
people were held hostage and somebody was stabbed or injured or shot and god,
by god’s grace there’s like two doctors in the house and they’re performing a
surgery without no anesthesia, no anything and they’re just trying their best to
make the best of this situation and save this person. But then again, there’s a
shotgun pointing upward so maybe this person is being abused cause they have a
really strange, weird face like that straight face with no emotion in their eyes so
maybe this person is actually shot the person that was providing for them because
they felt a certain way or they weren’t given a certain attention or a certain love
that they see other people get like. Like there’s a coldness in this kid’s eyes and
it’s scary like, why? There’s a dark window… there’s a person on the table you
can see he’s in pain but this kid just has a straight face as if he’s the murderer
himself almost. Maybe he was abused, maybe he was hurt or maybe his mother
was hurt. Maybe somebody he was close to got hurt in such a way that this is the
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person on the table affecting everybody and he thought maybe if I killed him,
maybe if I shot him he’d stop. Future wise, futuristic wise maybe he becomes a
serial killer later on in life, I don’t know. Or he becomes a person that wants to be
part of the laws made. Maybe this is a mistake he never realized would affect so
much, Or maybe he doesn’t care cause he felt like this was justice served. And
these doctors they’re working effortlessly to try and save but this is only the first
phase of the surgery as I can see.
The story also includes an addition of more ominous characters – “somebody broke into
the house” and “a lot of people were held hostage,” and multiple references to injury, assault,
entrapment, and cruelty abound. Paula’s ability to integrate the characters in the story is
compromised also by the fact that she frequently performs a reversal of roles. Cramer defines
this defensive maneuver in the denial category, when characters take on qualities previously
stated conversely in the story. Paula does this often – the protagonist is the abuser, then becomes
the abused, then returns to becoming a serial killer in the future. It seems that the reversals serve
the purpose of covering all potentially threatening possibilities – as if the organizing principle is
to name all the sources of potential danger.
Paula’s response to the next card is especially revealing because it is a low arousal card
with one of the more neutral images in the series. A young woman is sitting in a chair with her
chin in her hand, looking off in to the distance. Paula’s high generation of aggressive and hostile
projections is readily apparent:
(Card 8GF) This woman looks as if she’s daydreaming. She looks like she’s been
working really, really hard cause her hands are kind of, her sleeves are up. So
maybe she’s a maid. And she wishes to be rich one day and to fall in love one
day. Maybe she wishes for the man of her dreams to come through the door where
she’s in love with this person that she’s cleaning for. She sees all the things
around him going awry or maybe he’s a single father or a single rich man. I don’t
know, with children. And she wants to be the mother at that point. Or maybe she
sees this rich man and his wife fall in love and she’s jealous. She could be jealous
and thinking of ways to get rid of this extra person that’s in her way. So that she
gets what she wants. Or maybe she’s just thinking overall like how she’s going to
provide for her family. Cause she’s just daydreaming for the most part. She
doesn’t have a rough face. She looks like she’s just zoned out. Maybe she’s in a
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corner of a house. She finds her own little corner like after she stops working for a
little bit, takes a rest, and she just started daydreaming about what she could have
done in the future, what she could have done in her past and be her future. Um
certain answers and certain decisions she made, she could’ve made better and
now she realizes that she had no choice. Or maybe she’s a single mom with a lot
of kids and the man is probably beating her cause it looks like she’s a little
bruised here on top of her eye a little bit. So she said this is her only escape I
guess, out of the household. She’s cleaning somebody else’s house and she’s
away from her husband, she’s away from her kids. But she probably worries
about her kids thinking that her husband can do the worst possible things to them.
But! yet again she has to make a living. Futuristic wise, she said she’s going to get
herself out of certain situations but she still remains because there’s the roof over
her head, over her children’s head. Her husband is probably still going to remain
her husband because she loves him and she knows him before all the abuse. Or
she sees the family that she wants or - and she wants it for herself too but then
again she’s not as strong as other woman may be. So she decides she’ll stay, hope
to get a little more money and get her kids out of whatever situation she’s going
through. That’s it.
The protagonist begins with an idealizing wish to fall in love. Quickly this devolves, once
“she sees all the things around him going awry,” and her defensive reactions are unleashed, as if
her flight into fantasy was intolerable. Themes of jealousy, threat, uncertainty, mistrust and
abuse are imbued into the story but the underlying affects are not confronted. The clear sense of
threat, that something will go awry, is dealt with by shifting attention to another, possibly more
heinous event. Paula’s reference to the figure’s “bruised here on top of her eye a little bit,” is a
striking comment, generating the plotline of abuse.

Case of “Pam”: Late exposure to potentially traumatic events
Pam is a 50 year old Hispanic female who endorsed her first sexual assault at age 46. She
met criteria for PTSD.
(Card 1) Oh, wow. It looks like he’s a kid who’s been sexually abused and he
doesn’t know what to do. Um, he trusted his violin instructor and he’s at home
right now and he doesn’t want to go to violin practice and he’s not telling… Like
his mother’s saying “You have to go! You have to go! You have to go!” and he
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doesn’t want to go, but he doesn’t know what to do about it. (And what’s going to
happen?) He’ll get raped. He’s going to get molested.
Pam’s response is a good example of an evident mismatch between the common themes
typically pulled for by this low arousal card and Pam’s interpretation of the boy’s situation. If the
TAT is a task that tests for the “mastery of morbid affects” through the use of narrative (Tuber,
2012), Pam’s response calls into question her basic reality testing. She projects an inordinate
degree of threat experienced by the boy, as well as an added, abusive violin teacher. The boy’s
mother too, is mis-attuned, hostile, and can’t be trusted as someone the boy might turn to for
safety. In contrast to a Pollyanna-ish story that ends with a superficial ending, this one completes
with determined danger. Nonetheless, the effect of Pam’s degree of apprehension for threat
based on this card may indicate her great need to expel the hostile affects she experiences
everywhere.
Pam’s responses are also striking for the ways in which she intrudes upon the storytelling
task by inserting her own, first-person subject. On Card 3BM, and then a few times throughout
the task, she uses the pronoun “I,” breaking the frame of the task.
(Card 3BM) Battered and abused. Yeah, this is, this is like someone, you know, I
don’t know, I can’t tell if it’s a woman? Yeah, probably a woman, who’s feeling
like I do. You know, drained, don’t know what to do, where to go, who to talk to.
Physically abused, mentally abused. And, um, just in pain. Just don’t know what
to do. Just in a hole. What led to that could be through no fault of her own. Just a
bad decision. Even the best decisions can get you in situations like this woman
here.
Pam shows her limited ability to create a narrative with temporal parts. She aligns herself with
the character’s affective state and then has difficulty moving beyond it. The character, and Pam
for matter, is stuck with her own bad decision. There is no elaboration beyond the perception of
her battered experience. By the end, it is as if Pam is describing herself, providing a view into the
egocentric quality of Pam’s limited object relational world.
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High Identification Users
Case of “Isaac”: Early exposure to potentially traumatic events
Isaac is a 35 year old male, identified as “other,” who experienced sexual assault at 10 years old.
He met Criterion A only, and does not carry a PTSD diagnosis.
(Card 1) So this is a story of a little boy who plays violin. One day he was playing
his violin and one of his strings broke and so he had no strings and he was
wondering how to fix it. So he sat down on the table and put his hands on his head
and was thinking about how he can fix the violin so he can play it again. (What’s
going to happen?) And he realized that he doesn’t really have the money for it
himself so he’s thinking that eventually when his grandpa comes home, his
grandpa will take him out and help him get the violin restrung. (What is he
thinking and what is he feeling?) So he’s thinking how that, long that will take to
get it fixed and, and he’s frustrated because he had to practice and wasn’t able to
do. He wants to make music.
Isaac demonstrates a seamless integration of conflict, resolve, and temporality in his narrative.
There is some paucity of affect – the little boy thinks his way through the situation initially until
Isaac is prompted to answer about what he might also be feeling. There is also identification with
a benevolent, older figure who will aid the boy and support his ambition to make music.
As the task progresses, the conflict of indecision becomes a predominant theme throughout
Isaac’s responses, and actually appears on nearly every card after Card 1:
(Card 3BM) So this is a story about a young adolescent that…. is tired, and has a
lot of emotion I think. And sat down one day just to have some quiet time, by I
guess himself, and needed some quiet time to just collect his thoughts away from
the parents, and….. (So what’s going to happen and what is he thinking and
feeling?) I think that he came there because he was tired and needed to rest and
collect his thoughts in solitude and, eventually he’ll get up and have to face the
rest of his day. And I think, he’s thinking about some of the different decisions
that he’s had to make. And he’s felt a bit indecisive about them, and…maybe
perplexed because he doesn’t know how to make the right decision, or decision
that he feels comfortable with. But he wants to do his best so after the quiet time,
he will have to make the decision that he thought about.
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Unlike Card 1, Isaac’s protagonist in this card identifies parental figures who he needs to
separate from. Though he begins the response with reference to affect – “lot of emotion,” there is
little elaboration beyond this. In fact, Isaac returns to a conflict of right versus wrong through a
decision he needs to make.
(Card 8GF) This is a story about a woman, who’s an artist and lives alone, and is
having a cup of tea, and is waiting, thinking, contemplating, some of their work.
And she’s been living alone for a while and is thinking about moving to another
place, maybe to another location in the world; is thinking about if this is the right
space for her, in the city. Or if these people she’s meeting, are the right people
that she’s meeting. (What’s going to happen next?) She’s going to make a
decision, whether not to do that, whether not to move, and she… she’s trying hard
because of the financial situation she’s in. (What is she feeling?) She’s feeling a
lot of emotions. Like she wants to stay, she wants to go, and she’s feeling
inhibited somewhat.
Case of “Ivan” : Late exposure to potentially traumatic events
Ivan is a 29 year old Black male, who experienced combat in a war zone at age 19. He met
criteria for PTSD.
(Card 1) He’s upset because his violin broke and he really wants to play it. It’s
frustrating him and he wants to throw it on the floor and break it. He’s bored and
he, um, he doesn’t know what to do with himself. You want me to keep on going?
(What’s going to happen?) He’s going to find a way to try to fix it, but it’s not
going to work, so he’s going to end up eventually breaking it.
Readily apparent in Ivan’s response is the confounded and constricted sense of time. The boy is
upset in the present because the violin is broken, yet he wants also to break it himself, and in the
future, he’ll still “end up eventually breaking it.” His sense of the future is restricted and
hopeless, as if he is telling a story with no possibility for a new ending. It ends just as it begins,
with no hope for a reparative or agentive future. Also evident is the easily accessed aggressive
impulse – “he wants to throw it on the floor and break it,” that Ivan quickly departs from by
stating immediately after that the boy is “bored.” Ivan undoes the aggression by reverting to a
state of unknowing, evidenced further by his own direct questioning to the administrator about
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the task. In identifying with the frustration, there is a sense of hopeless destruction. Ivan shows
very little affective flexibility. There are few choices about how to feel about this situation.
In the next few responses, an interesting shift occurs around managing the aggressive impulse
Ivan identified with above. In Card 2 and Card 3BM, Ivan’s protagonists get punished for doing
things they’d like to do:
(Card 2) She just got out of school. She doesn’t want to go straight home. She
wants to stay out and gaze upon the hills and watch the farmers plow the land.
She’s going to get in trouble when she gets home because she was supposed to go
straight home from school and she didn’t listen.
(Card 3BM) She’s real tired. She went out last night, to hang out with some
friends. And now she has to go to work in the morning. But she can’t get out of
her bed, so she decided to kneel down and put her head on the bed. She will be
running late. She’s going to get written up for it. Anything else?
There are several striking things to note in Ivan’s responses. For one, there is some improvement
in temporal breadth, in contrast to the circularity of time in Card 1. However, both cards have a
very similar arc whereby the protagonist will “get in trouble,” and pay consequences for doing
what she prefers. For both responses, there is a clear presence of a powerful, externalized
authority. Ivan reveals how rigid his internalized prohibitions are, limiting his ability to imagine
any other outcome other than reproach. In Card 3BM, Ivan completely omits mention of the
object commonly seen as the gun, further indicating how his aggression, readily seen in Card 1,
turns latent. Instead, he effectively aligns it with a harsh superego that becomes the main
organizing force of his stories, indeed contributing to a less constricted narrative than his first
response, albeit still limited in its affective range.
By Card 8BM, Ivan reveals his range of functioning, evidencing his ability to integrate
the characters quickly into relationships that make sense of the complex scene.
(Card 8BM) This one, um, seems like a bystander, is in the medical facility and
like he wants to look at the operation but he really doesn’t so he’s staring away.

85

But it’s hard for him, and it’s making him sad because he can’t really look at what
they’re doing to the guy on the table. (What led up to it, what’s going to happen?)
Hm. He’s an intern, and the guy on the table got a gunshot wound. And what’s
going to happen is he will eventually turn around and watch and try to take the
bullet from his side.
He does not completely shy away from the aggression here, incorporating it as a “gunshot
wound.” Furthermore, he turns his “bystander,” into an “intern,” who, despite not wanting to
look, takes action in the end to “take the bullet.” Ivan also reveals more about his conflicts – “he
wants to,” “he really doesn’t,” and “it’s hard,” “it’s making him sad because he can’t really
look.” Ivan reveals identifications with various parts of himself – as a passive bystander, a timid
intern, and then a brave hero, and his conflicts around reconciling these possibilities breaks
through. Ivan’s protagonist also struggles with his own desire, fear, and sadness, and eventually
can “take the bullet” but offers no explanation for how or why.
Ivan’s progression through the task reveals a range of his defensive operations; how his
superego contains his aggression, can organize his thoughts under pressure, but also how it limits
his overall emotional range. Ivan does demonstrate his reliance on identification to regulate
destructive impulses.
Figure 4 depicts a snapshot of the physiological profiles of the 4 cases previously
illustrated. The overall higher and increasing physiological profiles of high identification users
Isaac and Ivan, stand in contrast to the markedly lower physiological profiles of high projection
users, Paula and Pam. Their length of narrative responses and time of physiological responding
in these 4 cases also demonstrates a broad range. The figure reveals an overall flattening effect
from high projection users, and activated responsiveness from high identification users. While
there is some overlap of themes across the 4 cases, the sense of temporal constriction and limited
integration of other characters is prevalent in high projection users. Fending off the negative
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affects seemed to be a primary goal. In contrast, high identifications users explicitly struggled to
integrate their object relational world, grappling with indecision and somewhat more cognitively
complex tasks.
This graphic depiction of individual cases can only be cautiously viewed in light of this
study’s main findings but provides another window into the relationship between defense use
and physiological response.

Figure 4
Physiological Profiles of Case Studies: High Projection & High Identification Users with Early and Late Onset of PTEs
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Clinical Implications of the Current Findings
The results of this study demonstrate that an individual’s response to trauma is multidetermined and complex. The study gives empirical evidence as to how the onset of potentially
traumatic events play a role in how psychological defenses impact the body’s autonomic
reactivity. This study builds upon prior research that investigates the subset of re-experiencing
and hyperarousal symptoms so common to traumatized populations, providing evidence that
situation-specific variables must be taken into account. For example, hypervigilance may not
equate to physiological arousal, and the relationship between the two are impacted by individual
differences including defense use and personality structure.
Importantly, the study provides evidence that patients who dissociate characterologically
may be qualitatively different than adults who use a form of repression as an effective coping
strategy. In treatment, clinicians must seriously consider that it may not always be important to
“uncover” early traumas. Rather, a thorough assessment and close attention to how an individual
uses their defense of choice as an effective coping strategy is of utmost importance. This will
provide clinicians with a strength-based perspective to work with and ultimately improve
treatment when amplifying ways to work with a patient’s defenses.
Given the complex relationship between defense use and physiology, working with
trauma populations would warrant careful attention to patients’ often variable, subjective
experiences of stress, their own active/passive coping strategies, and baseline physiological
assessments as part of the therapeutic process. Using neuro or biofeedback techniques to help
patients themselves understand, and realize their own stress response may be empowering to
allow them to “see” change in their own bodies. This may be one way to incorporate the patient’s
body in a safe and controlled way in the therapeutic relationship.
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research
The results of this study carry implications for clinicians and researchers working with
traumatized populations, but there are a number of shortcomings of the design and execution that
limit conclusions. First, the study was ultimately exploratory in nature and thus tested hypotheses
that were purposefully broad in their specification. Although valuable for refining questions for
further research and theory development, this approach limits the specificity of findings.
One major weakness of the study is its sample size of 43, with group sizes between 14-15
individuals limiting the generalizability of findings. The mixed trauma sample, including those
with interpersonal and non-interpersonal traumatic exposure, made comparisons to other studies
that focused on childhood abuse or adult-onset trauma, more difficult. In addition, because
chronicity of traumatic exposure is a delineating feature of complex trauma, it would be prudent
to include a more thorough assessment of the nature and intensity of indexed traumas in future
study designs and data analyses.
One major conceptual shortcoming of the study is the tendency to equate early onset
trauma with a complex PTSD picture. Certainly, suggesting causal links in this regard runs
counter to the aims of this study, which privileges the heterogeneity of factors contributing to
traumatic response. Relatedly, an alternative interpretation in understanding why the early onset
group using greater projection demonstrates decreased physiological reactivity, is to consider
that this is a population already traumatized. In other words, perhaps their greater use of
projection is not indicative of greater pathology, but perhaps of an altered reality.
The use of a projective assessment such as the TAT is a strength of the study in that it
provides a way to overcome the limitations of self-report measures. It would be particularly
meaningful to continue using projective measures in future studies to better understand the
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complex clinical symptom picture including unsymbolized experiences and heightened
dissociative processes so common in this population (Arnon et al, 2011). Given the rich data that
the TAT provides, future studies could further analyze the narratives to investigate linguistic
characteristics and storytelling capacity. This would expand upon existing research linking
aspects of cognitive style and dimensions of alexithymia to even better differentiate the defense
processes that these individuals may be utilizing.
While the DMM is well-validated through repeated use, it does not capture many
operationalizations of ego-defense, and excludes the representation of one very commonly used
defense of repression, pervasive to trauma populations. Some of the clinical implications of
working with patients who use repression as an effective coping strategy versus patients who
may dissociate characterologically have been previously discussed. It is quite possible that the
adaptive defense use captured by findings in this study may have overlap – conceptually and
empirically – with a flexible coping style, a style that has been correlated with good prognostic
outcomes in the literature (Mancini & Bonanno, 2006; Bonanno et al., 2004). Specifically,
Coifman and Bonannno (2007) have attempted to measure repressive coping behavior called
“affective-autonomic response discrepancy” (AARD), that is defined as occurring when
individuals report relatively little negative affect during stressful tasks while simultaneously
evidencing heightened physiological responses. Their findings include that the tendency to direct
attention away from negative affective experience, such as repressive coping, may promote
resilience following extremely aversive events (Coifman and Bonanno, 2007). The burgeoning
area of research in traumatic resilience may use similar conceptual models to the one used in this
study – a review of convergent findings would be an exciting next step. Nevertheless, future
studies might not shy away from the challenge of finding an ecologically valid way to assess
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repression, a mechanism that may very well underlie many other defenses and thus may provide
a more nuanced understanding of defense mechanisms.
The advantage of using SCR rate is that it can measure activity of the autonomic response
system that is not always under conscious control. It provides an objective measurement of
subjective experiences. However, there is conflicting evidence in how different systems within
the autonomic nervous system respond differentially to psychological processes (Hughes,
Uhlmann, & Pennebaker, 1994; Fowles, 1980; DePierro, J., D’Andrea, W., Pole, N., 2013).
Though beyond the scope of this study, including a measure of the parasympathetic branch,
which also corresponds to stress and cognitive engagement, would be useful. For example, lower
heart rate and respiration rate, both measures of the parasympathetic nervous system, have been
linked to individuals with trauma exposure (Hopper, Spinazzola, Simpson, & van der Kolk,
2006); Sack, Hopper, & Lamprecht, 2004). Research attending to PTSD symptom clusters and
both ANS branches (sympathetic and parasympathetic) may clarify the meaning of blunted and
heightened physiological responses. In short, despite the compelling utility of using skin
conductance measures as an indicator of a psychological state or process, changes in skin
conductance and electrodermal activity do not occur in isolation. Rather, they occur as a part of
complex set of responses mediated by the autonomic nervous system. It is crucial to determine
the psychological meaning of any particular SCR after establishing a well-controlled stimulus
situation. The paradigm of this study relies greatly on subjective coding and interpretation – both
of defense use and nature of trauma. Future studies should attempt to replicate findings with
improved participant criterion selection.
This study has attempted to make links between unconscious defense use and
physiological markers between individuals who have been exposed to potentially traumatic
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events. Individuals recruited in this study were already exposed to PTEs. They were considered
vulnerable if they endorsed symptoms. The research into PTSD vulnerability factors has most
often entailed non-biologic measures (Orr, S.P. & Roth, W.T., 2000). Future research can use
electrodermal lability and habituation rate to investigate pre-trauma vulnerability. This research
would expand existing findings that suggest that the conditionability of individuals impact their
sensitization to trauma (Orr et al, 2000). These individuals may not fare as well in extinctionbased treatments. Furthermore, physiological measures should continue to be used not just as
predictors of diagnostic picture, but as valuable information for treatment and recovery.

Conclusion
The aim of this exploratory study was to link psychoanalytic theories of trauma and its
impact on the mind with psychobiological research of how trauma lives in the body. The present
study expands on prior research (Cramer, 2003) providing evidence that defense mechanisms do
in fact, moderate the relationship between stress and physiological response. The subjective
interpretation of traumatic events and the psychological defenses used, start the cascade of
psychobiological responses to trauma. The present study attempted to identify the psychological
concomitants of these individual differences within a population exposed to potentially traumatic
events, and their proclivity for using different defense mechanisms. There is evidence to support
that there may be distinct dissociative processes that differentiate the use of projection and
identification.
In short, this study supports the notion that early exposure to trauma does not give one a
fixed identity. PTSD is a living diagnosis, with responses that are infinitely complex, based on
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individual differences and vulnerabilities. Post-traumatic responses must be understood from a
developmental psychopathology framework, supporting the notion that potentially traumatic
experiences in an individual’s life contribute to a loading of multi-determined factors in a
person’s life.
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Appendix A
The current diagnostic criteria for DESNOS is listed here: (Luxenberg, Spinazzola, & van der
Kolk, 2001)
I. Alteration in Regulation of Affect and Impulses (A and 1 of B-F required):
A. Affect Regulation
B. Modulation of Anger
C. Self-Destructive
D. Suicidal Preoccupation
E. Difficulty Modulating Sexual Involvement
F. Impulsive & Excessive Risk-taking
II. Alterations in Attention or Consciousness (A or B required):
A. Amnesia
B. Transient Dissociative Episodes and Depersonalization
III. Alterations in Self-Perception (2 of A-F required):
A. Ineffectiveness
B. Permanent Damage
C. Guilt and Responsibility
D. Shame
E. Nobody Can Understand
F. Minimizing
IV. Alterations in Relations With Others (1 of A-C required):
A. Inability to Trust
B. Revictimization
C. Victimizing Others
V. Somatization (2 of A-E required):
A. Digestive System
B. Chronic Pain
C. Cardiopulmonary Symptoms
D. Conversion Symptoms
E. Sexual Symptoms
VI. Alterations in Systems of Meaning (A or B required):
A. Despair and Hopelessness
B. Loss of Previously Sustaining Beliefs
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Appendix B
Summary of Defense Mechanism Manual Scoring Categories (Cramer, 2006)
DENIAL:
1. Omission
2. Misperception
3. Reversal
4. Statements of Negation
5. Denial of Reality
6. Overly Maximizing Positive, Minimizing Negative
7. Unexpected Goodness, Optimism, Positiveness, Gentleness
PROJECTION
1. Attribution of Aggressive or Hostile Feeling, Emotions, or Intentions to a Character, or Other
Feelings, Emotions, or Intentions that are Normatively Unusual.
2. Additions of Ominous People, Ghosts, Animals, Objects or Qualities.
3. Magical or Circumstantial Thinking
4. Concern for Protection from External Threat
5. Apprehensiveness of Death, Injury, or Assault
6. Themes of Pursuit, Entrapment, and Escape
7. Bizarre or Very Unusual Story or Theme
IDENTIFICATION
1. Emulation of Skills
2. Emulation of Characteristics
3. Regulation of Motives or Behavior
4. Self-esteem through Affiliation
5. Work: Delay of Gratification
6. Role Differentiation
7. Moralism
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